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CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON, 1937-1957
WARREN L. SHATTUCK*

Reliable information about trends, developments, and possible abberations in an area as extensive as contracts is difficult to achieve by
reading advance sheets as they appear. The preparation of this article
has been in part motivated by a desire to acquire such information,
related to the Washington decisions of the twenty years just past.'
Another motivation has been reluctance to let die of inattention a
project initiated in 1935 with the publication of the Washington Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts.' Such annotations
make the Restatement more useful, and provide ready access to the
Washington cases for the practitioner familiar with the Restatement's
organization. This discussion has therefore been arranged in terms of
the Restatement's major topic headings.
MEANING OF TERms

Implied Contracts. "Implied contract" and "contract implied in
fact" are terms in general use both in Washington and elsewhere. It
has long been clear that they are used to indicate a contract established
by a particular type of proof, rather than a legal relation differing in
any way from "contract" or "express contract." The Washington court
provided a good basic explanation in 1931: "It matters not whether
the claimed agreement be considered as an express or an implied contract. The result will be the same. An implied contract differs not from
an express contract except in the mode of proof."' Later opinions contain some helpful amplification. "A true implied contract, or contract
implied in fact, is an agreement which depends for its existence on some
act or conduct of the party sought to be charged, and arises by inference
or implication from circumstances which, according to the ordinary
course of dealing and the common understanding of men, show a mutual
intention on the part of the parties to contract with each other."4 "Before a court can find the existence of an implied contract in fact, there
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.

More precisely, the discussion encompasses contracts decisions reported in 191
Washington Reports through 49 Washington Reports 2nd Series.
2 A supplemental annotation was published in 13 WAsH. L. REv. 20; it continued
the coverage to include decisions reported in 176 Washington Reports through 19')
Washington Reports.
'Troyer v. Fox, 162 Wash. 537 at 554, 298 P. 733, 77 A.L.R. 1132.
4 Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn.2d 128 at 137, 201 P.2d 129 (1948).
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must be an offer; there must be an acceptance; the acceptance must be
in the terms of the offer; it must be communicated to the offeror; there
must be a mutual intention to contract."5
Whether there is a sufficiently certain line of demarkation between
the proof requisite to an "express contract" and the proof contemplated
by "implied contract" to justify continued use of the latter term, may
well be questioned.
It is apparent that what is "implied" in a transaction characterized
as "implied contract" is a promise or a set of them. The existence of a
promise is typically the critical issue in litigation which produces
opinions containing the term. Passages such as that quoted above at
note 4, in their stress of "act or conduct," seem to supply both a test
for determining whether an implied promise exists and a justification
for distinguishing transactions grounded on express promises. The
inference is that words fall into one category, yielding express promises
by interpretation, while conduct falls into another, yielding implied
promises by implication. If the inference is unsound, continued use of
the term "implied contract" serves no useful purpose. It is suggested
that the inference is unsound.
In practice, implication and interpretation tend to coalesce. The
apparent cleavage between words and conduct disappears and so does
assurance about the ability of a court to determine precisely the
boundaries of the implication process. A promise can of course be
expressed by conduct. "Promise," as a term, merely describes an undertaking, to quote the Restatement of Contracts,' "either that something
shall happen, or that something shall not happen, in the future." Purpose can be expressed either by non-verbal action or by non-action. It
can also be expressed by inept words, words not manifestly promissory.
Evidence both of conduct and of inept words is often before the court
in the same case. Conduct may be equivocal, and disputes about the
meaning of conduct do not differ materially from disputes about the
meaning of words. Segregation of "implication," in the sense of inferences about purpose, and "interpretation," in the sense of ascribing
meaning to an expression of purpose, can be extremely difficult or impossible.7 A clearer recognition that the promise essential to the legal
relation known as contract can be proved by any relevant evidence, and
that a promise proved in one way works just like one proved by some
GMilone and Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 363 at 363, 391 P.2d
759 (1956) noted 32 WASH. L. REv. 76.
6 § 2(1). As to promises and implication see RESTATEIENT, CONTRACTS - 5 (1932);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 3 (rev. ed. 1936); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 17. 18 (1950).
7See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 561 et seq. (1950).
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other type of evidence (excepting the possible application of a Statute
of Frauds) might facilitate the solution and rationalization of controversies of the types now said to involve "implied contracts."
Quasi-Contracts. To describe the type of legal liability fastened on
the recipient of benefits, quite without regard to any expression by him
of a purpose to pay, the Washington court seems to prefer the term
"quasi-contract." The distinction between "contract" and "quasicontract" has been so dearly stated by the court as to leave no room
for reasonable dispute about these terms.'
Bilateral and unilateral. These are contract terms often employed
and usually deemed free from multiple-meaning hazards. In Cook v.
Johnson9 the court adopted the commonly stated definitions of them. 10
MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT

Mutual assent. In this society the responsibility for selecting those
types of promise which shall be enforced by group compulsion of one
sort or another has been for the most part entrusted to courts. From
the extant opinions it can be quickly determined that something variously described as "mutual assent," "mutual intention," or "a meeting
of the minds" is a criterion in the selection process.1 A proposition so
sChandler v. Wash. Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wn.2d 591 at 600, 137 P.2d 97
(1943): "Quasi-contracts arise from an implied legal duty or obligation, and are not
based on a contract between the parties, or any consent or agreement." See also Bill v.
Gattavara, 34 Wn.2d 645 at 650, 209 P.2d 457 (1919) ; Mill & Logging Supply Co. v.
West Tenino Lumber Co., 44 Wn.2d 102 at 113, 265 P2d 807 (1954).
9 37 Wn.2d 19, 221 P.2d 525 (1950), noted 26 WASH. L. REv. 227.
10 "The law recognizes, as a matter of classification, two kinds of contracts--bilateral
and unilateral. A bilateral contract is one in which there are reciprocal promises. The
promise by one party is consideration for the promise by the other. Each party is bound
by his promise to the other. A unilateral contract is a promise by one party-an offer
by him to do a certain thing in the event the other party performs a certain act. The
performance of the other party constitutes an acceptance of the offer and the contract
then becomes executed. Until acceptance by performance, the offer may be revoked....
An example of this class of contract is the offer of a reward." Some of the court's
language, e.g. "A unilateral contract is a promise... an offer," and "performance...
constitutes an acceptance ... and the contract then becomes executed," must be questioned. The central ideas, that a bilateral contract results from an exchange of promises and that a unilateral contract results from an offer requesting an act or forbrance plus accomplishment thereof, conforms to the normal patterns. See RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 12 (1932) ; 1 Wn.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 13 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 21 (1950). These definitions were approved in Millett v. Sampson, 41 Wn.2d
442, 249 P.2d 773 (1952). Much the same language had earlier been used in Higgins
v. Egbert, 28 Wn.2d 313, 182 P.2d 58 (1947). The conclusions reached in Cook v.
Johnson upon applying the law to the facts requires further comment. It is discussed
in the next section.
11 Our court seems to like "meeting of the minds"; the phrase appears in many of
its opinions. For example: Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn.2d 128 at 138, 201 P.2d 129 (1948) ;
Newsome v. Miller, 42 Wn.2d 727 at 732, 258 P.2d 812 (1953) ; Richards v. Kuppinger,
46 Wn.2d 62 at 66, 278 P.2d 395 (1955) ; Hedges v. Hurd, 47 Wn.2d 683 at 690, 289
P.2d 706 (1955) (dissent); Milone and Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 49
Wn.2d 363 at 368, 301 P.2d 759 (1956).
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generally phrased is little better than an aphorism, of no real help in
solving contract-formation problems. What must be known is the
behavior patterns which do or do not meet the criterion." A start in
this direction is afforded by the opinions summarized in the Restatement
of Contracts: "The manifestation of mutual assent almost invariably
takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party accepted by the
other party or parties."1 The working rules are evidently going to be
rules about offer and acceptance. Before examining them in detail,
however, it is desirable to take another look at implied contracts and
at contracts embodied in documents.
Implication. The Washington court has a distressing tendency to
resolve controversies about implied promises without discussing offer
and acceptance. Opinions so written inform one that mutual assent can
be established by implication but shed no light whatever on the meaning
of "offer" or "acceptance."
Much implied-promise litigation grows out of services rendered without the formality of a contemporaneous or precedent express promise
to pay." Controversies of this type are difficult to discuss, save on the
12

An exception must be acknowledged; in certain prior obligation and reliance situations a promise may be enforced without regard to mutual assent. See the discussion
below in the section entitled "Informal contracts without assent or consideration."
13 § 22.
14 See 1 WILLISTON, CoNnAcTs § 23 (rev. ed. 1936).
15 McKevitt v. Golden Age Breweries, Inc., 14 Wn.2d 50, 126 P.2d 1077 (1942), in
which recovery was permitted, the court saying: "The rule is well established that the
acceptance of the services rendered by an attorney may raise an implied promise to pay
therefor, which will supply the place of a contract of employment. If an attorney renders valuable services ... to one who has received the benefit thereof, a promise to pay
the reasonable value of such services is presumed unless the circumstances establish the
fact that such services were intended to be gratuitous" p. 59; Jones v. Brisbin, 41 Wn.2d
167,247 P.2d 891 (a similar holding); Hardung v. Green, 40 Wn.2d 595, 244 P.2d 1163
(1952) (prima facie case for recovery held established) ; Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn.2d
128, 201 P.2d 129 (1948), in which recovery was denied, the court saying: "It is the
accepted doctrine in this state that an essential element of an implied contract under
which recovery is sought for services rendered or material furnished is that it must
appear from the evidence that the services were rendered or the materials furnished
under such circumstances as to indicate that the person rendering or furnishing them
did so with the expectation that he would be paid therefor, and that the party for
whom they were rendered or furnished then expected, or should have expected, to pay
for them." p. 138; Kellogg v. Gleeson, 27 Wn.2d 501, 178 P.2d 969 (1947), where the
key to a holding for the defendant is found in the court's conclusion: "The circumstances were such that any reasonable man placed in appellant's position would not
have expected that he would be required to make any such payment"; Ammerman v.
Old National Bank, 28 Wn.2d 239, 182 P.2d 75 (1947), where a housekeeper hired in
1937 for $5 per week plus room and board was by the time of the employer's death in
1946 rendering nursing services under difficult conditions, and sought unsuccessfully
to recover for the greater worth of the nursing services; Fineson v. McMahon, 12
Wn.2d 41, 120 P.2d 482 (1941), where recovery was unsuccessfully sought, after the
recipients' death, for services rendered during the several previous years; Bank of
California v. Ager, 7 Wn.2d 179, 109 P.2d 548 (1941), a similar holding; Kremmel v.
Schnaufer, 4 Wn.2d 242, 103 P.2d 38 (1940), another similar holding. The opinions in
the three cases last cited purport to demand of a claimant who presses his claim for the
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offer and acceptance level, and the court's opinions reflect that fact. Is
one who requests services, or who receives unrequested services, legally
obligated to pay? There is ample precedent in other states for a simple
and direct approach in terms of mutual assent."0 A request for services
is an offer if the circumstances would indicate to the other party as a
reasonable man an undertaking to pay for them. A proffer of services
is an offer if the circumstances would indicate to the other party as a
reasonable man an expectation of payment. Acceptance is evidenced
by rendition of the requested services in the one situation and by receipt
of the proffered services in the other. The critical issues are invariably
factual. The stress must be on the inferences about purpose, reasonably
derivable from the setting in which the transaction occurred, rather than
on actual purpose. Inferred purpose must often be pieced together from
evidence which recreates the context of request or proffer. This evidence supplies the controlling elements, which are, to borrow Judge
Steinert's felicitous phrasing, "the7 ordinary course of dealing and the
M
common understanding of men.
Two services cases of unusual interest reached the court during the
period under review. They put in issue the existence of a promise by a
general contractor to pay for the service he receives when a subcontractor gives him a bid. This problem and a companion one, whether a
subcontractor must stand by his bid after the general contractor has
used his bid figures, have long troubled the construction industry and
its counsel."8 The opinions in these cases leave unanswered the key
question, whether the context in which a request for or proffer of a subcontractor's bid is usually made, will move the court to find a promise
by the general contractor to pay.
Western Asphalt Co. v. Valle 9 was an action by a subcontractor to
recover the reasonable worth of its services in supplying the defendant
general contractor with subcontract bid figures. Plaintiff's theory was
that a contract implied in fact existed, and its officers testified that
compensation was expected for their service, either by being awarded
the subcontract or otherwise. Defendant requested the bid figures, used
first time after the recipient of services has died, proof of more than ordinary persuasiveness. Just what this really means in the way of added burden on the proponent
of such an implied promise is quite undeterminable.
16 See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 36, 36A, 90 (rev. ed. 1936).
17 Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn.2d 128 at 137, 201 P.2d 129 (1948). That intent as objectively manifested controls is well stated in Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wn.2d 41 at 54, 216
P.2d 196 (1950).
IsSee Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practicesin the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 237 (1952).
1925 Wn.2d 428, 171 P.2d 159 (1942), noted 42 ILL. L. REv. 259, 22 VAsH. L. REV.
139.
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them in part, received the main contract, and awarded the subcontract
to another. For defendant, testimony went in to the effect that it never
expected or intended to pay plaintiff, that it was not customary to pay
for such service, and that defendant never had paid for such service.
The appeal required the court to determine whether plaintiff's evidence
was sufficient as a matter of law to warrant submission of the cause to
the jury. The court held it was, saying: "The evidence presented a
case that should be determined by the trier of the facts-in this instance
the jury." No attempt was made in the opinion to indicate which evidence was deemed to be significant nor why it was significant. The
circumstances under which defendant requested plaintiff's figures" were
enough outside the normal pattern of dealing to make it desirable to
know what elements in the evidence the court regarded as important.
In Milone and Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc.,2 a subcontractor asserted a duty in the defendant, a general contractor, to award
it the subcontract, defendant having used plaintiff's bid figures and
having been awarded the general contract. Whether defendant requested plaintiff to bid is not clear from the opinion. Plaintiff prevailed
below. The trial court's decision was based in part on the Western
Asphalt Co. case, which was taken to mean that use of a subcontractor's
bid gives rise to an implied contract, and in part on industry custom.
The evidence of custom which was before the court is not set out. In
reversing, the supreme court denied the applicability of the earlier
decision, saying "the quotation of the subcontractor was secured by the
prime contractor under circumstances materially different." Specifications of the reasons why the differences were material would have been
helpful. The court also said: "Careful reading of the opinion does not
disclose that this court held that the use of a bid-gives rise to an
implied contract." Here again an explanation which would have been
useful was not given; the court did not discuss the part which use of a
bid can play in transactions of this type. There is even an unfortunate
inference that use of a bid is without legal significance. The court then
discussed plaintiff's bid as an offer to do the work and found no acceptance of it by defendant's use of the bid. The reason for this discussion
is difficult to understand. Plaintiff's theory was not that its offer to do
the work was accepted, but was, as the court stated it, that defendant
"was obligated to award the subcontract to respondent [plaintiff] at its
20 Defendant's request for plaintiff's figures was made shortly before expiry of the
time within which defendant's bid could be submitted, and was couched in somewhat
urgent terms.
2149 Wn.2d 363, 301 P.2d 759 (1956), noted 32 WAsH. L. REv. 76.
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bid figure .... " The court made no reference to the key passage in
the Western Asphalt Company opinion: "The fact that respondent
hoped to obtain a subcontract from the general contractor-and that
with this idea in mind, respondent made available to appellant its figures
-- is not necessarily inconsistent with its expectation that it would be
entitled to receive reasonable compensation for the service rendered if
appellant was awarded the construction contract and did not award
respondent the subcontract. . ." This passage seems clearly to recognize the possible dual nature of a subcontractor's bid-offer to do the
work, and service to the prime contractor. As in other instances of
services, a request for, or proffer of a bid may or may not be an offer.
The attendant circumstances must govern and must determine whether
the prime contractor's undertaking (where one is found) is to award
the subcontract to the bidder or is to compensate him in some other
way." It would appear that the court in the Milone and Tucci case
never addressed itself to the precise implied contract issue tendered by
the plaintiff.
The court went on to say:
Usage and custom are admissible to explain the terms of an express
or implied contract once the contract is established. The fallacy of the
trial court's second theory is that an implied contract cannot arise
from proof of usage and custom. The effect of custom or usage upon
contractual obligations is dependent upon the existence of an actual
contract between the parties. Where there is no contract, proof of
usage and custom will not make one.
Whether evidence of usage and custom is properly restricted to contract-interpretation issues will be discussed more fully at a later point. 3
The impact of the court's language on implied-contract litigation is the
sole concern here. This passage seems to mean, "we will consider evidence of customs when interpreting a contract which has been otherwise
established, but will not consider it where the issue is the existence of a
contract." It is very much to be hoped that the court did not actually
intend to embrace so narrow a position and that this portion of the
opinion will be clarified in future opinions.2 4 There is an obvious incongruity in determining the purpose expressed by either conduct or
words, without regard for the context in which the conduct occurred
or the words were spoken. Trade usage is certainly a vital part of the
22 Use of the bid and an award of the main contract to the general contractor could
be conditions implied in fact to the general contractor's duty to perform, if on the
request for or proffer of a bid these qualifications are properly inferrable.
23
See the discussion below, under the topic heading "Usage."
24
See 1 CORBiN, CoNTRAcrs § 23, and 3 CORBIN, CONnACTS § 534 (1950).
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context. If there exists in the building industry a common understanding about payment (or non-payment) for a subcontractor's bid, refusal to examine a request for, or proffer of, a bid in the light of that
understanding can hardly lead to a just result.
Goods may be requested or proffered in transactions which create
implied-promise difficulties analogous to those encountered in services
transactions. Whether an implied promise to pay accompanied the
request, and whether the proffer was an offer contemplating payment,
are commonly the issues. One who receives goods under circumstances
which would to a reasonable man indicate that payment is expected
will be deemed to have impliedly promised to pay. 5 A similar problem
reached the court in Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber Co., Inc.20 An
offeree was held to have accepted an offer reading "you can continue
to use this road for a payment for the use thereof at the rate of twentyfive cents per thousand for all logs transported .. ." The acceptance
(and the offeree's promise to pay) was proved only by showing that
the offeree continued to use the road. The offeree argued that it did
not intend to pay and had demonstrated its lack of purpose to pay by
not paying. The argument was entirely unsuccessful. The better evidence was deemed to have been provided by the offeree's use of the
road. In its refusal to attribute a wrongful intent to conduct of this
type, the opinion is typical. The Bakke case, in its lack of concern about
communication of the promise the offeree was held to have made, illustrates another characteristic of decisions in which a promise to pay is
found in receipt of goods or services.
The implication process is by no means restricted to controversies
about services or goods. A promise to share losses has been implied
where a partnership relationship was disputed. 7 A debtor who requested an extension of time was held to have impliedly promised to
pay interest during the extension period. 8 Implication seems to have
been the basis for a holding that continuance of the services, after the
period stipulated in an employment contract has expired, raises a "presumption" that the employee is "serving under a new contract having
25 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 21, 72 (1932) ; 1 WI.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 91
(rev. ed. 1936) ; Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn.2d 128 at 138, 201 P.2d (1938) (where the
court talked of "services rendered or material furnished").
26 49 Wn.2d 165, 298 P.2d 849 (1956). Comparable holdings are Bond v. Wiegardt,
36 Wn.2d 41, 216 P.2d 196 (1950); DeBritz v. Sylvia, 21 Wn.2d 317, 150 P.2d 978
(1944).
27 Stipich v. Marinovich, 13 Wn.2d 155, 124 P.2d 215 (1942) ; Bengston v. Shan,
42 Wn.2d 404, 255 P.2d 892 (1953) ; Eder v. Reddick, 46 Wn.2d 41, 278 P.2d 361
(1955).
28 Strong v. Sunset Copper Co., 9 Wn.2d 214, 114 P.2d 526 (1941).
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the same terms and conditions."2 A service station lessee, who undertook to pay a gallonage rental, was held to have impliedly promised to
operate a service station on the demised land.3" In Losli v. Foster"'the
court characterized as "implied contract" the relations between owner
and contractor, whose conversations about their transaction were most
inconclusive, the court being persuaded that the contractor was to build
2 it was recogfor a reasonable compensation. In Tonseth v. Serwold"
nized that a labor agreement entered into by an association of boat
owners and a fisherman's union might by implication become a part of
employment contracts made by an individual boat owner and his men.
In Hedges v. Hurd" Judge Hill, in a concurring opinion, was prepared
to resolve the problem created by an earnest-money agreement calling
for the execution of a real estate contract (terms not specified) by
implying an agreement to negotiate in good faith the terms of the contemplated real estate contract.
These decisions and the services cases discussed above provide ample,
and discouraging, laboratory material for anyone inclined to the view
that implication and interpretation are separable judicial technics.
Contract documents. Counsel who prepare contract documents
probably give little thought to mutual assent, assuming that whatever
demands it involves will be met when the document is signed. The
assumption seems to be a valid one. 4 It does not, however, necessarily
follow that mutual assent fails where the parties do not sign. Implication may supply the missing element. In several instances where the
seller signed a real estate contract document and the buyer did not,
evidence showing that the buyer regarded the contract as extant has
led the court to conclude that the contract came into existence. 5 The
opinions refer to the buyer's conduct as proving he "ratified" or
"adopted" the contract document. These are not familiar methods by
which promises are made. Implication would appear to be a better
explanation.
29

Holton v. Hart Mill Company, 24 Wn.2d 493, 166 P.2d 186 (1946).
80 Reeker v. Remour, 40 Wn.2d 519, 244 P.2d 270 (1952).
3137 Wn.2d 220, 222 P.2d 824 (1950). Cf. Pape v. Armstrong, 47 Wn.2d 480, 287
P.2d 1018, where the court without discussion simply said: ".... [W]e cannot find any
evidence from which we could reasonably infer a mutual assent of the parties thereto."
32 22 Wn.2d 629, 157 P.2d 333 (1945).
33 47 Wn.2d 683, 289 P.2d 706 (1955).
34 See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 23 (rev. ed. 1936); 1 CoRniN, CoNTRACTs § 31
(1950) ; presumably the person who signs first makes the offer, which is accepted by
the other party as he signs.
35 Bulmon v. Bailey, 22 Wn.2d 372, 156 P.2d 231 (1945) ; Van Geest v. Willard, 27
Wn.2d 753, 180 P.2d 78 (1947) ; Erckenbrack v. Jenkins, 33 Wn.2d 126, 204 P.2d 831

(1949).
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Offer. Since the legal relation known as "contract" is ordinarily the
product of "offer" and "acceptance," clear definitions of these terms
are certainly useful in analysis and argument of the confused indicia
of purpose which clients so often bring to lawyers. For "offer" the
Restatement of Contracts provides: "An offer is a promise which is in
its terms conditional upon an act, forbearance or return promise being
given in exchange for the promise or its performance.""0 So formal a
definition is not to be found in Washington decisions. Neither do the
decisions give any reason to doubt the acceptability of this definition
to the court.37
Proof of promise and condition, by implication, has already been
discussed. An interesting contrast is provided by Jones v. Allen. 8
There the court faced an exchange of promises to marry and evidence
which elicited this remark about plaintiff's reaction to defendant's
promise: "[MIe are convinced that she did not believe that any such
promise would be performed, for she had said that she would not believe appellant [defendant] under oath." By way of conclusion the
court said: "If she attached no credit to his promise, then she cannot
predicate any action upon it, for a promise, to be binding, must be
accepted as well as given." Although the thought behind the court's
word "accepted" can only be surmised, it seemingly contemplates an
expectation that performance will be forthcoming. Whether the court
meant to restrict the definition of "promise" by excluding expressions
which do not induce such an expectation, as suggested by Professor
Corbin," or to restrict the definition of "offer" by excluding a promise
which does not, cannot be determined. Nor is the distinction of practical significance; no offer exists if there be no promise. Words which
state as clearly as can be, both a purpose to do something and a request
06§ 24.
3 Cases in which a promise coupled to a request for a counter-promise or an act,
is flatly called an offer, are indicative. For example: Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber Company, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 165, 298 P.2d 849 (1956). See also Milone and Tucci, Inc.
v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 49 Wn2d 363, 301 P.2d 759 (1956) ; McGregor v. InterOcean Ins. Co., 48 Wn.2d 268, 292 P.2d 1054 (1956) ; Hill's Inc. v. William B. Kessler,
Inc., 41 Wn.2d 42, 246 P2d 1099 (1952). In Cook v. Johnson, 37 Wn.2d 19, 221 P.2d
525 (1950), noted 26 WAsHi. L. Rav. 227 (1951), a unilateral contract was said to be
a "promise by one party . . .and offer by him to do a certain thing in the event the
other party performs a certain act." p. 23. On the other hand, there are opinions in
which the court tells us only that the evidence sufficiently or prima fade established
mutual assent. Western Asphalt Co. v. Valle, 25 Wn.2d 428, 171 P.2d 159 (1946) ;
Gaasland Co. v. Hyak Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 42 Wn.2d 705, 257 P2d 784 (1953).
Any attempt to identify the evidence which proved the offer is sheer guesswork.
3s'14 Wn.2d 111, 127 P.2d 265 (1942).
o He proposes this definition: "A promise is an expression of intention that the
promisor will conduct himself in a specified way or bring about a specified result in the
future, communicated in such manner to a promisee that he may justly expect performance and may reasonably rely thereon." 1 CORBIN, CONTrACTS § 13 at p. 25 (1950).
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for a counter-performance may in their context fail to state an offer."
It will on occasion be difficult to determine whether a communication
is really an offer, or whether it is a preliminary move in negotiations
which may or may not culminate in an offer." An attempt to put this
problem in issue was made in Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber Co,
Inc.2 In summarily disposing of it, the court provided a test of general
import: "[W]hether a writing will constitute a definite offer which the
other party may turn into an obligation by acceptance, depends upon
the intent and purpose of the writer." In applying this test, it may be
doubted that the court will permit the writer's subjective intention to
govern. The words "intent" and "purpose" probably refer to intention
objectively manifested.43
A variation of the preliminary-negotiation problem is encountered
where an alleged offer contemplates incorporation of the proposed
agreement into a formal contract document. A reference to such a
document is often ambiguous. It may indicate a purpose to defer legal
relations until the document is signed, or a purpose to create a more
formal record of the transaction, should a contract be concluded by the
parties' correspondence, informal memoranda or conversations. Since
there is usually no direct evidence of the parties' actual purpose, the
argument and disposition of this interpretation issue will necessarily
be very difficult. In deciding the several cases of this type which have
reached it during the past twenty years, the court has given much
weight to he completeness or incompleteness of the agreement at the
stage to which the parties did carry it." If any important details were
40 The result reached in Jones v. Allen is that generally expectable. 1 CORBIN, CoN-

§ 15 (1950) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 21 (rev. ed. 1936). Representative are
the "joke contract" cases. Some of these, however, involve a joke marriage and a
refusal to dissolve it for reasons which have no bearing on mutual assent. Also typical
is the casebook favorite, Higgins v. Lessig, 49 I1. App. 459 (1893), where the key
words were: "I will give $100 to any man who will find out who the thief is. . .", and
the context persuaded the court that the words "should be regarded rather as the
extravagant exclamation of an excited man than as manifesting an intention to contract."
41 See 1 WILLISTO N, CONTRACTS § 27 (rev. ed. (1936); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§
22, 23 (1950) ; Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Egan, 195 Wash. 330, 80 P.2d 813
TRAcTs

(1938).

Wn.2d 165, 298 P.2d 849 (1956).
43 Cf. Gaasland Company, Inc. v. Hyak Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 42 Wn2d 705 at
710, 257 P.2d 784 (1953). See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 106 (1950).
44 Building Service Union v. Seattle Hospital Council, 18 Wn.2d 186, 138 P.2d 891
(1943) ; KVI, Inc. v. Doenbecher, 24 Wn.2d 943, 167 P.2d 1002 (1946). If no such
details remain for settlement, a finding of intent to make of the document merely a
memorial is to be anticipated. Moxee Co. v. Hughes, Inc., 24 Wn.2d 224, 163 P.2d 603;
Fuller v. Ostruske, 48 Wn.2d 802, 296 P.2d 996 (1956) ; Pettaway v. Commercial
Automotive Service, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957) ; McKennon v. Anderson,
49 Wn.2d 55, 298 P.2d 492 (1956). From the Moxee Company opinion another idea
42 49

can be obtained. It appeared that the contemplated document was expected to serve a
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left to be later determined and included in the formal document, a
finding of intent to have no contract until that document is executed
should be anticipated.,"
An expression of purpose, ostensibly promissory in nature but so
vaguely phrased as to create real doubt about what the "promisor" was
to do, will not be an offer.46 It probably is not even a promise. If the
questioned language appears in a contract document, courts tend to
discuss the problem in terms of "uncertain agreement" rather than in
terms of offer.
One source of litigation about certainty is an undertaking to render
a performance, the exact nature of which is to be later determined by
the application of an indicated standard. Only if the standard so
operates that the promised performance can be ascertained with assurance when performance time arrives, will the certainty requirement be
satisfied. If the standard by which the performance is governed is a
subsequent agreement by the parties, the promise is uncertain. As
stated by Professor Williston: "Since either party by the very terms
of the promise may refuse to agree to anything to which the other party
will agree, it is impossible for the law to affix any obligation to such a
promise.""7 It must not, however, be too quickly assumed that language
which is ostensibly only an agreement to agree will receive a literal
interpretation.
In Hubbell v. Ward48 the questioned promise was contained in an
earnest-money agreement which specified the total price, the parties,
collateral purpose having nothing to do with contract formation; it was aimed to provide proof that the transaction was not a sale, if the hop control board should require
such proof. Evidence of this type should help materially to prove that the parties did
not intend to defer contract formation until the document was executed. On the other
hand, direct evidence that a detailed memorandum agreement was not intended to be
effective will induce a decision against contract formation pending execution of the contmplated formal document. Pacific Food Products Company v. Mukai, 196 Wash. 656,
84 P.2d 131 (1938).
45 See also RESTATFMENT, CoNmAcrs § 26 (1932); 1 WmSTON, CoNTRAcTs §§
28, 28A (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CoRBIN, CoNmcrTs § 30 (1950).
40 See RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcs § 32 (1932) ; 1 WILLIsTON, CoxTRA cTs §§ 37 et
seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 29, 95 etc. (1950).
That this problem can on occasion overlap the one discussed in the preceding
paragraph is demonstrated in Pettaway v. Commercial Automotive Service, Inc., 49
Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957). There, both the function of the later anticipated
formal contract document, and certainty in the informal agreement, were in issue.
That the two problems can be confused is demonstrated in the dissenting opinion,
Hedges v. Hurd, 47 Wn2d 683, 289 P.2d 706 (1955). Having characterized the basic
transaction (an earnest money agreement providing for closing by execution of a real
estate contract) as a contract to make a contract, the opinion cites RESTATE MNT,
CoNTcrs § 26 (1932) and the Washington decisions in which no contract was found
to exist because the parties intended to postpone legal obligation until a formal document was executed.
47 1 WILLisToN, CoNTRACTs § 45 at p. 131 (rev. ed. 1936).
48 40 Wn2d 779, 246 P.2d 468 (1952).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VoL 34

and the land. The buyer undertook to "pay Nine Thousand ($9,000)
Dollars down and sign a contract for the balance, payable at $200.00
or more per month, including interest at the rate of 5%o on deferred
balances." Since none of the subsidiary details of the proposed real
estate contract were stipulated, these were evidently to be later agreed
on by the parties. The buyer's promise was to do something, the exact
nature of which awaited the later agreement. The court held that the
buyer could not specifically enforce an agreement to agree on and
execute a real estate contract document, but went on to hold that he
could have a decree directing the seller to convey, provided the full
price was paid in cash within thirty days. The reasoning behind what
may at first encounter seem to be a remarkable tour de force is not
clearly discernible." The result would be understandable had the buyer
promised in the alternative to pay cash or to sign a contract. The court
may have achieved this interpretation, although the earnest-money
agreement does not readily yield such a meaning. The pre-payment
option was to be contained in the real estate contract, which never came
into existence. 0
Hedges v. Hurd"' involved similar facts and an action by the purchaser for damages. Before the action was brought, the seller offered
to convey the property on prompt payment in full, a proposal which the
buyer rejected. In holding for the plaintiff, the court stressed the need
for simplicity in earnest-money agreements, and the presence in this
agreement of the usual closing details. Neither point is very persuasive.
If an earnest-money agreement calls for closing by execution of a purchase contract, there is no good reason why a copy of the proposed
contract document cannot be attached. In no other way can disputes
about purchase-contract details be obviated. The agreement was not
49
The court's explanation was this: "The agreement contains within itself the essential elements of a binding contract.... Respondents (buyers) were given an option to
pay the entire consideration at any time. The subject matter of the agreement, the
considration and terms of payment are all set forth, and it is evident from a consideration of all the terms of the agreement that it was not intended merely as a preliminary
negotiation." The first sentence squarely conflicts with the court's previous conclusion
that the promise to execute a purchase contract was "not sufficiently definite and certain" to permit of specific enforcement. The phrase "the consideration and terms of
payment are all set forth" must mean the price was settled. The technical consideration
provided by the buyer, in the earnest money agreement, was in his promise; if that
fails for uncertainty there is no consideration. Indeed, a promise to agree creates an
illusory promise issue and can be disposed of on that ground as readily as on the mutual
assent ground.
GOA somewhat similar decision is Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d 175 (1926), noted 36
YALE L. J. 707 (1927), in which the buyer's promise was to pay $18,000.00 "on terms
to be agreed on," and the court read into his promise the alternative of paying in full

at once.

5147 Wn.2d 683, 289 P.2d 706 (1955).
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complete. The critical closing details, what was to be in the purchase
contract in the way of insurance, forfeiture, maintenance, risk of loss,
and like provisions, were not stated. The decision is not supported by
the Hubbell case. There a contract was found, but it must have been a
contract to buy and sell for cash. If such a contract was made by
Hedges and Hurd, Hurd was not in default on it. 2 Hedges must have
recovered on a contract to execute a purchase contract. On indistinguishable facts, the court said in Hubbell v. Ward: "We conclude that
the agreement here, in so far as it looks to the preparation and execution of a future real-estate purchase contract upon which the minds of
the parties have not met, is not sufficiently definite and certain and
cannot be specifically enforced." These cases appear to be in conflict."
As will be seen shortly, a not dissimilar problem has been solved by
reading into an otherwise uncertain promise a standard which cures the
defect; e.g., interpretation of a promise to pay a rental to be agreed on
as meaning a promise to pay a reasonable rental. Despite evidence in
the opinions in both the Hubbell and Hedges cases of a contrary assumption by the court, the contents of real estate contract documents,
particularly those covering residential property, may have acquired
enough uniformity in a given community to justify resort to the same
technic. If a seller and buyer have undertaken to close their earnestmoney agreement by executing a purchase contract, do they not mean
a "reasonable" contract? There should be no greater difficulty in determining what contract details are reasonable and appropriate in light of
local usage than there is in determining what sum is a reasonable rental
or a reasonable price. The amount of the down payment and the
amounts of the periodic payments are the only details for which the
technic seems inappropriate. It can of course be argued that a promise
to sign a contract document with details to be thereafter agreed on
5

2 Two judges dissented in Hedges v. Hurd. Two others concurred, emphasizing the
seller's refusal to negotiate with the buyer about the purchase contract details, and
saying: "[T]here is an implied agreement .. . that they will negotiate in good faith
the terms of the executory real-estate contract contemplated by the agreement. The
terms of such executory contracts are now so generally standardized that bona fide
disagreement on the terms not covered by the earnest-money receipt and agreement is
quite unlikely." For refusal to negotiate, damages measured as they would be for
breach by the seller of a contract to sell and convey were evidently deemed to be
appropriate. Whether a promise to "negotiate in good faith" is any less uncertain than
a promise to agree may well be arguable.
53 That damages were sought in the Hedges case provides no valid basis for harmonizing the two decisions. Where the issue is contract formation, no different tests
for certainty are properly employed in law and in equity. Granted that a contract
exists, specific enforcement may be refused because it lacks the degree of certainty
required for the framing of th decree. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs § 370 (1932) ;
5 WiILisToN, CoNnRcs § 1424 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 5 CoRrN, CoNTaRcTs § 1174 (1950).
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actually reserves to the promisor with unambiguous precision the privilege of insisting on unreasonable details, precluding any interpretation
which would fasten on him a "reasonable" form.
It will be observed that a promise to execute a purchase contract,
where parties, property, price, down payment, and monthly payments
are specified, is perfectly definite. An exchange of such promises by
seller and buyer leaves no legal demand unmet. 4 Clauses about insurance and the dozen and one other miscellany typically found in these
documents are not necessary to contract formation. There was an
uncertainty problem in the Hubbell and Hedges transactions only because the court implied an intent by the parties to have these miscellaneous clause. A possible solution to the certainty problem might
be found in refusal to make this implication. If the court feels obliged
to read into the bare word "contract," which the parties used, an intent
to have clauses about insurance and so forth, it would be sound also to
imply an intent to have clauses "such as are reasonable in light of local
usage."
Parties, property, term, and rental are the only requisites for a lease.
An agreement to execute a lease, which specifies these, can nevertheless
fail for uncertainty because additional details are contemplated and
left for future negotiation. For example, where the parties undertook
to execute a "proper lease," the court found the word "proper" to mean
"terms going beyond the legal minimum" and refused specific enforcement." Where the greement was to execute a lease "on terms to be
agreed upon," a like result was reached." If the parties simply agreed
to execute a "lease" (property, term, rental, and parties being specified)
the question of implying intent to have additional details would arise,
as in the real estate contract cases. Leases are probably less standardized than are real estate contracts and hence less easily salvaged by
resort to the "reasonable" standard. The court has demonstrated no
inclination to use that standard where miscellaneous lease terms are
the source of the uncertainty.
A promise to pay rent in an amount to be later agreed on has been
54 It is assumed that absence of specification of the form of the deed is not a serious
defect. This is certainly a detail which can readily be supplied by reference to usageevidence. Whether the grantee can from that evidence establish a right to anything
more than a quit claim deed is another matter.
55 Keys v. Klitten, 21 vVn.2d 504, 151 P.2d 989 (1944).
The court apparently found
no contract existed, rather than that a contract existed which was not specifically
enforceable; the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action with prejudice was approved.
Judge Simpson dissented, arguing that the word "proper" did not require the interpretation given it by the majority, and should instead be taken to mean "a lease prepared
in conformity to the agreement."
56 Finch v. King Solomon Lodge No. 60, 40 Wn.2d 440, 243 P.2d 645 (1952).
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differently treated. Here "agreed on" has been interpreted to mean
"reasonable rent"; the uncertainty thus vanishes and there is a contract
capable of specific enforcement." Presumably, purchase-sale agreements leaving the price for later determination would receive the same
8
treatment.Y
A quite different type of problem results from an agreement to buy
and sell at a price to be later fixed by the seller. Although it is more
commonly and easily analyzed as an illusory promise-consideration
problem, an occasional decision goes into the uncertainty aspect. So
approached, the solution may be far from obvious. The seller's undertaking is to sell and deliver; it appears to be certain. The buyer is to
pay a sum the amount of which is unknown when he promises but
which will be certain enough when performance time arrives; the seller
will by then have set the price. Although this is a standard as sure in
operation as are many which courts deem to be adequate, the Washington court" ° and others 0 have refused to enforce such agreements.
Non-enforcement may well be justified. The seller's control is excessive; he can, by manipulating his price, make it impossible for the
buyer to buy. One who has so high a degree of control over his undertaking really has not promised anything. Absence of a promise by the
seller, and hence no offer (or no acceptance), would be a rationale
preferable to uncertainty.
Where the seller's control is less sweeping, the agreement may be
enforced. In Guyen v. Time Oil Co.,," the court refused to invalidate
for uncertainty a service station lease calling for the sale and purchase
of gasoline at the lessor's posted tank wagon price. There was no more
certainty here than there is where the seller is to fix the price for an
57 Blume v. Bohanna, 38 Wn2d 199, 228 P.2d 146 (1951). A good many courts have
refused to invoke the "reasonable" standard in this type of case. See 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 45 at p. 132 (rev. ed. 1936); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1174 at p. 761
(1950). Of the approach taken by our court, Corbin says: "... [T]he later cases now
generally hold that specific enforcement will be granted at a rental to be determined
by the court as the reasonable one."
IsAs to this and variations, see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 41 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 97 (1950). Bishop v. Williams, 32 Wn.2d 50, 200 P.2d 497
(1948) may be a contrary holding. To defendant's statement "I will buy his shares,"
plaintiff replied, "I will accept that offer." In this action for specific enforcement,
relief was refused. The opinion is unintelligible; it might be read as inferentially declining to supply the missing price by implication of "reasonable price."
50 Washington Chocolate Co. v. Canterbury Candy Makers, Inc., 18 Wn.2d 79, 138
P2d 195 (1943).
130
See 1 CopRiN, CONTRACTS § 98 at p. 311 (1950).
6146 Wn.2d 457, 282 P.2d 287 (1955). The Washington Chocolate Company case
was distinguished on the ground that there the seller could fix the price without regard
to the prices it was charging its other customers. Although the court does not make
the point, an oil company which tried to manipulate its prices to all of its customers
would quickly be out of business.
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individual buyer, but there is a good deal less risk of improper use of
the power to fix the price where the resulting figure appertains to all
of the seller's customers.
Several other cases putting certainty in issue were decided; 62 none
merits particular discussion. Attention must however be called to Westland Construction Co., Inc. v. Berg, Inc.,63 in which apparent uncertainty in a written offer was resolved by parol evidence, and to two
cases in which undertakings uncertain when expressed were held to
have been made certain by subsequent expressions of purpose. " These
62 Foelkner v. Perkins, 197 Wash. 462, 85 P.2d 1095 (1938) ("reasonable time"
implied); Bloom v. Christensen, 18 Wn.2d 137, 138 P.2d 655 (1943) (earnest money
agreement to be closed in part by signing a purchase contract; in an action by the
broker for his commission the court characterized the earnest money agreement as "a
valid contract enforceable by a suit for specific performance." In Hubbell v. Ward,
40 Wn.2d 779, 246 P.2d 468 (1952) this case was distinguished as involving a different
issue and the phrase "enforcible by a suit for specific performance" was said to have
been unnecessarily used in the earlier opinion); Washington Machinery & Supply
Company v. Zucker, 19 Wn.2d 377, 143 P.2d 294 (1943) (the problem and its solution
appear in this quotation: "A contract of guaranty is not uncertain in amount merely
because it was not known at the time it was made what the ultimate liability would
be.... When the guaranty under consideration was made, it was with reference to
an obligation the amount of which was to be determined when an oven was manufactured and the necessary equipment for it was assembled.") ; St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber
Company v. Fox, 26 Wn.2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946) (A proposal to sell for a figure
stated, "adjusted more or less as follows," the adjustments to be regulated by several
details requiring further agreement by the parties, was held to be no offer) ; Schuehle
v. Schuehle, 21 Wn.2d 609, 152 P.2d 608 (1944) (a proposal which was in its context
ambiguous and possibly the product of mistake was held to be no offer for lack of
certainty; the rationale seems inappropriate); Pettaway v. Commercial Automotive
Service, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957) (the essential elements in a contract
to buy and sell a car were stated by the court and the trial court's instruction on the
certainty with which these must be identified was approved). See also Winslow v.
Mell, 48 Wn.2d 581, 295 P.2d 319 (1956) and Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47
Wn.2d 454, 287 P2d 735 (1955), noted 31 WAsH. L. R-v. 107 (1956).
63 35 Wn.2d 824, 215 P.2d 683 (1950) (on the basis of plans which he had examined,
a plasterer made a bid to a general contractor, worded: "Our bid for lathing and plastering the main floor of your plan No. 85 is $505.00. An additional $35.00 is to be added
if the recreation room ceiling is to be plastered. For lathing and plastering the main
floor of your plan No. 68 our bid is $575.00." Dispute developed about the scope of
the work; in this litigation the bidder asserted his bid was too uncertain to be an offer;
the plans were not detailed in the particulars which caused the dispute; the court
accepted as a curative and without discussion, testimony by the general contractor that
he had verbally spelled out these details in the negotiations which preceded the bid.
The decision probably illustrates a useful technique; apparent uncertainty may vanish
upon interpretation of the critical language. It might also be seen as illustrating a
closely related technique; an offer may by implication draw in details specified in prior
negotiations. Whether the parol evidence rule might affect a contest of this type is an
inquiry into which the court did not go.)
64 Christofersen v. Radovich, 23 Wn.2d 846, 162 P.2d 830 (1945) (a contractor who
built is entitled to his pay even though his promise to build was uncertain for lack of
specifications) ; Platts v. Arney, 46 Wn.2d 122, 278 P.2d 657 (1955) (an agreement
to exchange property and calling in part for the execution of future contracts, terms
not specified, became certain enough for enforcement when the contemplated contract
documents were thereafter prepared and executed. Said the court: "The defense of
uncertainty in the terms of a contract is not applicable in an action based upon the
contract when performance has made it certain in every respect in which it might have
been regarded as uncertain.") Although the theory on which evidence created after
the legally ineffective initial agreement serves to make that agreement a contract is
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not only suggest methods by which counsel can on occasion persuade
the court that what appears to be uncertain is really certain but also
emphasize the relationship between interpretation and uncertainty.
Any discussion of certainty is premature, pending completion of the
interpretation process. Ambiguity, the product of an expression of
purpose which conveys multiple and conflicting meanings, can easily be
confused with uncertainty.6 5 The latter, as a legal term, is properly
restricted to expressions of purpose which, upon interpretation (that is,
after any ambiguity present has been resolved), fail to identify the
proposed performance with the degree of precision demanded by courts.
Termination of offers. The court has had little occasion of late to
consider the methods by which offers come to an end; its few decisions
on termination conform to the familiar pattern.66 An offer can state its
duration and expires when that time runs out;6" an offer which does
not state its duration ends when a reasonable time has elapsed; 68 an
offer is ended by rejection;" a purpose to reject is evidenced when an
offeree makes a counter-proposal; 7 0 an offer unsupported by consideramost obscure, these cases represent the position generally taken by American courts.
I CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 101 (1950). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 33 (1932).
In terms of technique, the lawyer is able to marshall clarifying evidence from words or
conduct fairly indicative of purpose, following and supplementing the uncertain expressions of purpose first used.
6 Largent v. Ritchey, 38 Wn.2d 856, 233 P.2d 1019 (1951) is a good example of an
ambiguity problem disposed of as such, with no confusing references to uncertainty.
To an earnest money agreement was appended an undertaking by the seller to "pay a
commission of5% DolIars ($-)."
The court upon examining this
ostensibly meaningless gibberish, in its context, quickly found it to express a purpose
to pay 5% of the sales price. See also n. 63 above.
66 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 35 et seq. (1932).
67 Higgins v. Egbert, 28 Wn.2d 313, 182 P.2d 58 (1947) (An offer was made by a
writing dated February 18, mailed to the offeree on March 4 and received by him on
March 5th. It recited that the offer would be open for thirty days; the act called for
by the offer was tendered by the offeree on March 22. The problem was of course
interpretation; the court found the duration to be thirty days from February 18th.)
Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Company, 33 Wn.2d 169, 205
P.2d 597 (1949) (also raised an interpretation issue; a "first refusal" provision in a
lease, so phrased as to give the lessee thirty days within which to consider the proposal
should the lessor decide to sell, was found to mean thirty days without regard to interim
termination of the lease term.) In Pavey v. Collins, 31 Wn.2d 864, 199 P.2d 571
(1948) the court held that an exclusive listing ceased to have legal force after the
specified time limit passed and rejected an argument that it was renewed or extended
by a subsequent document. In an older case, Wax v. Northwest Seed Company, 189
Wash. 212, 64 P.2d 513 (1937), the notion that the stated expiry date of an offer can
be "waived" by an offeror who receives a late acceptance was exploded. An offer which
has lapsed through passage of time is totally dead; any subsequent expression of purpose by the offeror can have legal effect only as of that time and if it meets the usual
tests for an offer or an acceptance.
69 Coleman v. Davies, 39 Wn2d 312, 235 P.2d 199 (1951). See also State ex rel.
Philips v. Hall, 6 Wn.2d 531, 108 P.2d 339 (1940).
69 See the cases cited in the following note.
70
Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wn.2d 41, 216 P.2d 196 (1950) ; Pearce v. Dulien Steel
Products, Inc., 14 Wn.2d 132, 127 P.2d 271 (1942).
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tion is revocable prior to acceptance (but not after); whereas an option
is a contract and irrevocable during its term."
Acceptance. The principle which demands of an offeree precise and
literal compliance with the requirements of the offer is generally" and
in Washington"3 thought to be both fundamental and inflexible. Nothing
else or less can be an acceptance; the power created by an offer is a
strictly limited one, to be exercised only within the confines of the
offeror's request. If the offeror asked for a promise, he is entitled to
exactly that promise in unequivocal language (or to seasonable rendi71 Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn.2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949) (in which the offeree tried
without success to persuade the court that the offer, unsupported by consideration, was
an option by reason of promissory estoppel) ; Gray v. Lipscomb, 48 Wn.2d 624, 296
P.2d 308 (1956) (in which an optionee tried without success to persuade the court
that the time-life of the offer should be extended because of an alleged estoppel). Cook
v. Johnson, 37 Wn2d 19, 221 P.2d 525 (1950), noted 26 WAsr. L. REv. 227 (1951), is
notable for some uncommonly confused language, e.g.: "In a unilateral contract, the
offer may be revoked by the offeror before acceptance.... But such an offer may not
be revoked by either party to a bilateral contract." No variety of contract can be
"revoked." Defendant, who had made an offer calling with reasonable clearness for the
offeree to clean the ditches on the offeror's farm, an act, received by way of response
a promise by the offeree to do the work. Thereafter the offeror sold the farm; this was
known to the offeree before he commenced work. Defendant tried to invoke a variation of the proposition set out in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 42, implied revocation
by conduct inconsistent with continued existence of the offer and known to the offeree.
(That this Restatement section, in restricting its coverage to sale of or contracting to
sell specific property previously offered, too narrowly states the principle involved,
is suggested in 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 40.) The endeavor was thwarted by the court's
conclusion that the offeree's promise produced a bilateral contract. Apart from the
violence thus done to acceptance principles, the court's failure to discuss the novel and
unsettled implied revocation point raised by defendant is much to be regretted. Hopkins
v. Barlin, 31 Wn.2d 260, 196 P.2d 347 (1948) contains an excellent discussion of
options. So does Whitworth v. Entai Lumber Co., 36 Wn2d 767, 220 P.2d 328 (1950).
The specialized option variety known as a "first refusal" was discussed in Time Oil
Company v. Palmer, 28 Wn.2d 272, 182 P.2d 695 (1947) and Superior Portland
Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Company, 33 Wn.2d 169, 205 P.2d 597 (1949).
McFerran v. Heroux, 44 Wn2d 631, 269 P.2d 815 (1954) merits special reference.
Defendant gave plaintiff an option to purchase a grandstand and obligated himself to
rebuild it in the event of fire during the option term. A fire did occur, the grandstand
was destroyed, and the structure which defendant erected to replace it was not in the
court's view what the covenant to rebuild required. This action was brought, four and
one-half years prior to expiry of the option term, and without any attempt to accept
the offer to sell. Defendant was found to have breached the option contract. Substantial damages were awarded plaintiff. The decision achieved an eminently sound
analysis of the legal relations between optioner and optionee. Its implications for the
more common situation, in which an optioner disables himself by selling the property
to another, are clear and significant.
72 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 52, 58, 59, 60, 61 (1932) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§§ 72, 73 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 82 et seq. (1950).
73 The rule has been several times reiterated in the later cases: St. Paul & Tacoma
Lumber Co. v. Fox, 26 Wn.2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946) ; McGregor v. Inter-Ocean
Insurance Company, 48 Wn.2d 268, 292 P.2d 1054 (1956); Ferris v. Blumhardt, 48
Wn.2d 395, 293 P.2d 935 (1956); Blue Mountain Construction Company v. Grant
County School District No. 150-204, 49 Wn.2d 685, 306 P.2d 209 (1957). A limited
variation of the principle may occur where revocation of an offer for a unilateral contract is attempted after the offeree has partially performed. See RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS § 45 (1932). This proposition was mentioned in Ferris v. Blumhardt 48 Wn.2d
395, 293 P.2d 935 (1956), but was not applied because the offeree failed to render or
tender full performance.
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tion or tender of the offeree's performance);"' if he asked for an act,
he is entitled to exactly that act. An offeree who chooses to respond in
some other way may in doing so make a counter-offer; he does not
accept. Negotiations, however protracted, come to nothing if the parties
cling to positions which never coincide. 5
6 does not conform
Cook v. Johnson"
to the rule as stated and must
be regarded as anomalous. To an offer requesting an act, the offeree
replied by promising. Of this the court said: "He could have accepted
the offer by performance. But he went further than that and promised
to do the work. The promises of the two men thereby became reciprocal
and binding ...." The decision is an unfortunate invitation to litigation by other offerees who see in such an offer an election to respond
as they please. It should be overruled.
The opinion in Simms v. Ervin" also contains some disturbing
language. An offeree who was requested to promise to sell and deliver
a car and who promptly delivered it was said by the court to have
"waived the condition of written acceptance when he delivered the
Buick to the purchaser on February 18th."7 8 It would be difficult to
hit on a concept more foreign to the basic acceptance principle than
"waiver" by the offeree. Taken literally, the court has said that an
offeree can waive the promise or act requested by the offer, substitute
an act or promise he likes better, and thereby accept. Although no such
literal reading is likely to be given the opinion by either court or bar,
some other and less hazardous explanation for what is surely a sound
7
result is to be preferred. 1
Application of any rule about acceptance is impossible until implication and interpretation have delineated the offeror's proposed performance and the response he requested. Some options are singularly trouble7

4 tF-STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 63 (1932) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 78A (rev. ed.
1936).
71 Campbell Co. v. Holsum Baking Co., 15 Wn.2d 239, 130 P.2d 333 (1942);
Schuehle v. Schuehle, 21 Wn.2d 609, 152 P.2d 608 (1944) ; Inland Navigation Co. v.
McGrady, 43 Wn.2d 209, 260 P.2d 893 (1953), noted 29 WASH. L. REv. 99 (1954).
7637 Wn.2d 19, 221 P.2d 525 (1950), noted 26 WASH. L. REV. 227 (1951). See
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 73A (rev. ed. 1936).
77

Simms v. Ervin, 46 Wn.2d 417, 282 P.2d 291 (1955), noted 31 WASH. L. Rxv.

1027 8(1956).
The court went on to say, .
and such delivery was as unequivocal an acceptance of the order as a written confirmation." It will be noted that if the order contained a statement of express warranties to be made by the seller, this is accurate only
if the court is willing to imply those warranties from the seller's act of delivering. It
may be doubted that delivery, as an act, is ever entirely unequivocal.
70 Delivery could be performance and hence within the exception indicated at n. 74
above, if the offer requested only a promise to sell and deliver. It would also be
possible to regard the seller's proffer of delivery as a counter-offer, accepted when the
buyer received the car.
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some in their failure to specify whether the offeree is to pay or promise
to pay."0 Offerees' responses likewise often require interpretation8 ' and
exploration of the implication possibilities 2 before further progress can
be made. Indeed, an offeree who does not respond at all may in unusual
situations find his non-action interpreted as an acceptance.83
Much controversy over acceptances has resulted from sheer garrulity.
Many an offeree who intends (apparently) to accept an offer for a
bilateral contract, feels moved to paraphrase, discuss, add to, clarify,
or otherwise embellish the proposal, either as to what the offeror is to
do or as to what the offeree is to do, or both. Far better would be the
restrained reply, "I accept." Interpretation may show there are in
so An offer ambiguous in that it does not clearly indicate whether a promise or an
act is requested is usually interpreted as requesting a promise. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 31 (1932) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACrS §§ 62, 70 (1950) ; Jacoby v. Davis, 1 Cal.2d
370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934), noted 23 CALIF. L. REV. 213 (1935). Ambiguous options are
similarly handled; a notice from the optionee that he exercises the option is acceptance
enough, amply expressing his promise to buy and pay. 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 264
(1950). Whitworth v. Enitai, 36 Wn.2d 767, 220 P.2d 328 (1950), which might well
have raised the problem, went against the optionee on a different basis. In Kingston v.
Anderson, 3 Wn.2d 21, 99 P2d 630 (1940) the court disposed of an argument that the
optionee had not tendered the price before expiry of the option, by applying the debttender rule, saying

". .

. no one is required to go beyond the boundaries of the realm

in order to make a tender." The offeror lived in California; if payment was a part of
the required acceptance the court's reasoning cannot be approved; the option did not
state whether payment or promise was required.
8' Examples are Inland Navigation Co. v. McGrady, 43 Wn.2d 209, 260 P.2d 893
(1953), noted 29 WASH. L. REv. 99 (1954) and Hill's Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc.,
41 Wn.2d 42, P.2d 1099 (1952). These cases, in their diverse results, suggest that the
outcome of litigation on interpretation issues is beyond the realm of safe prediction.
82 An acceptance promise by the offeree will on occasion be implied from his conduct, although the offer did not request or authorize this mode of expression. Examples are: Jackson v. Gardner, 197 Wash. 276, 84 P.2d 992; Wenatchee Production
Credit Association v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Company, 199 Wash. 651, 92 P.2d 883;
De Britz v. Sylvia, 21 Wn2d 317, 150 P.2d 978 (1944) ; Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wn.2d
964, 184 P.2d 564 (1947) ; Jones v. Brisbin, 41 Wn.2d 167, 247 P.2d 891 (1952) ; Fuller
v. Ostruske, 48 Wn.2d 802, 296 P.2d 996 (1956) ; Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber
Company, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 165, 298 P.2d 849 (1956). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 72 (1) (a) (1932) and the cases cited in the previous discussion of implied
promises, n. 15 et. seq.
83 Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wn.2d 41, 216 P.2d 196 (1950) (offeree, an attorney, proposed a non-contingent fee; the client made a counter-proposal for a contingent fee;
the attorney without replying to the counter-proposal undertook the representation;
in doing so he accepted. Said the court: "If the modification was not satisfactory to
him . . . he should have replied to the letter. His not doing so led the Wiegardts to
suppose that he was agreeable to carrying out the contract according to their specifications.... It is clear they relied on Mr. Bond's silence to their detriment, and the trial
court was correct in holding him estopped to deny his acceptance of the contract as
modified.") See IZSTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 72 (1) (c) (1932); 1 CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 75 (1950) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 91 (rev. ed. 1936). These indicate
that past dealings or other circumstances may place an offeree under a burden to reply
to the offer, on pain of being held to have accepted. In Kalez v. Miller, 20 Wn.2d 362,
147 P.2d 506 (1944) the court reached a contrary result, saying without discussion: "We
•..do not find that this case falls under any of the very restricted situations in which
silence constitutes an acceptance of a contract." Letres v. Washington Co-op Chick
Association, 8 Wn.2d 64, 111 P.2d 594 (1941) is a similar holding.
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reality no deviations between offer and acceptance; or that an apparent
deviation was merely "requested" by the offeree and so not fatal to the
acceptance; 84 or that deviation is a "condition" exacted by the offeree,
whose reply is accordingly no acceptance.85
Disputes over accomplishment of the act requested by an offer for a
unilateral contract seem to be uncommon, save in connection with real
estate brokers. To aid in determining their rights, the recent opinions
have repeated a formula earlier stated: "A broker is entitled to his
commission when he produces a purchaser who is ready, able and willing
to purchase upon the terms required." 8 The critical issue is typically
a factual one.
An old principle infrequently encountered in modern appellate decisions restricts the power of acceptance to the offeree designated in the
offer." The court found occasion to invoke this proposition in Dorsey
v. Strand," the main problem being identification (in a very complicated
situation) of the offeree.
In Norm Advertising, Inc. v. Monroe Street Lumber Co., s1 the court
recognized again a well-established proposition-the place of contracting is the place at which the acceptance became legally operative. In
applying the rule, the court assumed without discussion the applicability
of an equally well-established proposition, which makes an acceptance84 Hardinger v. Blackmon, 13 Wn.2d 94, 124 P.2d 220 (1942). Kingston v. Anderson, 3 Wn.2d 21, 99 P.2d 630 (1940).
85 Pearce v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 14 Wn.2d 132, 127 P.2d 271 (1942) ; St.
Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Fox, 26 Wn.2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946) ; Newsom v.
Miller, 42 Wn.2d 727, 258 P.2d 812 (1953) ; McGregor v. Inter Ocean Insurance Co.,
48 Wn.2d 268, 292 P.2d 1054 (1956) ; Blue Mountain Construction Company v. Grant
County School District No. 150-204, 49 Wn.2d 685, 306 P2d 209 (1957).
8. Bloom v. Christensen, 18 Wn2d 137, 138 P.2d 655 (1943) ; Best v. Kelley, 22
Wn.2d 257, 155 P.2d 794 (1945) (stressing the requirement that the broker produce
a buyer willing to buy on the terms of the listing) ; Burt v. Heikkala, 44 Wn.2d 52,
265 P.2d 280 (1954), noted 30 WASH. L. REv. 103 (1955). See also Largent v. Ritchey,
38 Wn.2d 856, 233 P.2d 1019 (1951) (involving a promise to pay a commission, appended
to an earnest money agreement) ; Haynes v. John Davis & Co., 22 Wn.2d 474, 156
P2d 659 (1945) (involving the broker's interest under a forfeiture-of-down-payment
clause in an earnest money agreement) ; Guenther v. Equitable Life Assur. Society,
23 Wn.2d 65, 159 P2d 389 (1945) (involving a loan broker). Real estate brokerage
problems are discussed in 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 50 (1950).
87 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 54 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 80 (rev.
ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 56 (1950).
8s 21 Wn.2d 217, 150 P.2d 702 (1944).

8 25 Wn.2d 391, 171 P.2d 177 (1946).

See also

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

§ 74

(1932) ; 1 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 97 (rev. ed. 1936). The transaction involved was
of a familiar type-an order was solicited in Washington by a salesman for an outof-state seller; the order form signed by the buyer recited: "This agreement is subject
to the acceptance of Norm Advertising, Inc. at New York." The presence of this clause
makes certain that the order is an offer rather than an acceptance; if the acceptance
occurred in New York; the law of that place regulates issues of contract formation and
interpretation. This the court acknowledged. It then went on to apply Washington law
because the law of New York was not pleaded or proved.
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promise legally operative when put in the course of transmission by an
authorized or customary mode of communication."
Mistake. The concern here is with those errors in understanding
which arguably defeat mutual assent, rather than with mistake as a
basis for rescinding a contract the existence of which is not disputed. In
opinions the two problems are not always neatly labelled and pigeonholed, nor are the function of interpretation and the requirement of
certainty always carefully differentiated.91 Analysis and argument, and
decision too, of the conflicts which result from misunderstanding are
extraordinarily difficult. In recent years the court has had several encounters with this prickly area.
In Schuehle v. Schuehle 2 the court handled as a certainty problem a
failure of the parties to achieve concensus, they having attached differing meanings to a proposal which was patently ambiguous when read
against their precedent complex negotiations. The offeror may have
been negligent in phrasing his offer; the offeree was equally at fault in
failing to clarify the situation before purporting to accept. There was
no reason for preferring the meaning of either party, and the court
properly found no contract. Mistake, rather than uncertainty, would
seem the better explanation.9 3
If X writes Y: "I will sell you my red cow for $250.00," really meaning to offer his black cow, he has offered to sell the red cow. F's reliance
outweighs X's hardship. Only if Y knew or should have known of the
mistake will his acceptance fail to produce a contract for sale of the red
cow. 4 This old classroom hypothetical came to life in CarrollConstruction Co. v. Smith," with the accent on F's knowledge of the mistake. A
subcontractor submitted, and the general contractor accepted, a bid
reading: "Plumbing and heating will be done according to specifications
for the sum of $1419.31." The specifications referred to encompassed
both labor and materials in the heating installation. The offeror, sued
for not completing the work, testified that he was requested to and
intended to bid on just the labor part of the heating plant. The trial
court believed him and found "no meeting of the minds or contract
either oral or in writing ...

in regard to the heating job ....
§§ 64 et seq. (1932); 1 WILLISTON,
§§ 81 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 78 (1950).
90

See

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

91 See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 103 et seq.
TON, CONTRACTS § 94 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).

(1950) ; 2

CORBIN

9221 Wn.2d 609, 152 P.2d 608 (1944).
9 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71 (b) (1932).
94
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71 (1932); 1 WILLISTON,
1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 104 (1950).
,,,37 Wn.2d322, 223 P.2d 606 (1950).

" The
CONTRACTS

597 et seq.; 1 WILLIS-

CONTRACTS

§ 94

(rev. ed.
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mistake principle supports both the admission of this testimony and the
conclusion." In affirming, the appellate court did not discuss mistake;
it cited only precedents concerned with interpretation, and its opinion
is accordingly most confusing. The bid as made was not ambiguous."'
There is little prospect of success for the offeror or offeree who tries
to escape liability by showing he did not, before signing it, carefully
read a document which imperfectly expressed his intent. 3 Lake Air,
Inc. v. Duffy" is illustrative. The asserted defense failed. 'The partie
dealt face to face and the promisor was, as the court put it, "obviou.sly
in a hurry to take off." Could the promisee's knowledge of the haste or
inattention with which the document was executed be shaped into an
argument for charging him with awareness of the deviation, between
the promisor's purpose and the document? The inquiry is particularly
intriguing if the document is a form prepared by the promisee and states
in small print a variety of undertakings by the signer.
Two release cases must be mentioned here"00 as possibly indicative
of the court's reaction to a promisor who accurately expressed a.purpose
he was induced to formulate by his own unilateral misinterpretation of
the underlying data. These cases suggest that such a promisor cannot
successfully attack his promise as offer or acceptance and that he must
seek relief in equity; to prevail he must establish one or another of the
bases upon which the equitable remedy of rescission or cancellation will
be granted."'
06

Denial that the bid was an offer to accomplish even the labor part of the heating
installation was sound. The offeror did not in his bid make any such offer. His bid
covered labor and materials; that indivisible proposal had no legal efficacy. The trial
court evidently found there was no evidence other than the bid from which an offer to
supply the labor could be found.
97 On this basis one judge dissented. In a later case the court said flatly: "We have

often said the courts will not interpret the meaning of unambiguous contracts."
Schwieger v. Robbins & Co., 48 Wn.2d 22, 290 P.2d 984 (1955). See also n. 100 below.
98 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS § 70; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 35 (rev. ed. 1936);
3 CoRBiN, CoNmAcrs § 607 (1950).
9042 Wn.2d 478, 256 P.2d 301 (1953).
100 Bakamus v. Albert, 1 Wn.2d 241, 95 P.2d 767 (1939) ; Schwieger v. Robbins*&
Co., 48 Wn.2d 22, 290 P.2d 984 (1955). In both cases the person who executed the
release evidently tried to persuade the court that it was not intended to cover the cause
of action asserted in the present litigation. The evidence on which proof of intent was
sought to be made is not set out in the opinions and it is impossible to.determine the
exact issue. From the opinions it appears that the court found the releases to be
unambiguous and invulnerable to interpretation. That either plaintiff had evidehce
showing the release did not express his purpose and that the defendant knew it did
not, seems unlikely. The decisions are probably not authority against a plaintiff who

has such evidence. See the discussion at n. 96, 97 above.
101 Some courts have found no mutual assent, where a contractor made a bid, the
amount of which he achieved by faulty computation, and notified the offeree of the error
after acceptance and prior to any real change of position by the offeree. These decisions

conflict with the basic idea that an offeree may take an unambiguous offer at face value
if he has no reason to know it does not express the offeror's purpose. Hardshii on the
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CONSIDERATION AND ITS SUFFICIENCY

The basic principle. "Consideration" is a term singularly difficult to
define. Used initially only to mean "sufficient reason for enforcing a
promise," it has acquired a technical content, the precise scope of which
is debatable. Courts, more concerned with reaching just results than
with theoretic symmetry, have not coherently enunciated any "basic
principle." They seem rather to have produced a complex of principle
in which several themes are interwoven." 2
The promisee's detrimental reliance on a promise has been a reason
for enforcement since the early assumpsit actions, as has also the fact
of a debt antecedent to a promise to pay it.
With the development of mutual assent came an essentially commercial concept of contract; a transaction rooted in offer and acceptance
must be an exchange. This has much influenced the subsequent thinking
of courts about consideration. It has fostered the idea that the essence
of consideration is bargain and the allied ideas that consideration must
be contemporaneous or future, need not be adequate, is not concerned
with motive, and cannot be made out by proof of mere states of affairs,
such as love and affection.
It could be argued with some plausibility that mutual assent and its
attendant "bargain" or "exchange" has made any concomitant requirement such as consideration unnecessary. Nothing in the decisions suggests that the argument might be persuasive. Courts not only continue
to write opinions disposing of contract formation controversies on a
consideration basis where mutual assent would provide a more simple
and obvious solution; they also continue to police exchange transactions,
refusing enforcement of some types of bargain despite proof of mutual
assent.
All of these developments are arguably indicative of the burden laid
on the proponent of contract formation, by the substantive requirement
known as "consideration." An all-encompassing formula, if possible of
accurate statement, would certainly be clumsy and complicated. The
draftsmen of the Restatement chose instead to separate, and designate
as. enforceable without consideration or mutual assent, promises followed by detrimental reliance or preceded by a debt.' Promises of
other types were deemed obligatory only if supported by a "sufficient
offeror and the relative equities of both parties are elements far better handled in the

equitable procedures by which relief from a contract has traditionally been determined.
See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 501 (1932) ; 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 609 (1950).
102 See 1 WILISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 99 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CoNTRACTs
§§ 109 et seq. (1950).
'108 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 85-90 (1932).
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consideration." ' ' "Consideration" was so defined as to exclude anything not bargained for."0 5 Any act, forbearance, or promise bargained
for was declared to be a "sufficient consideration," save for a limited
0
number of stated exceptions."'
There is much to be said for the Restatement's organization. Most
promises are now made in an offer and acceptance context, and most so
made will be enforced. Stress may properly be laid on the universality
with which promisors who receive what they bargained for come under
a legal duty, and the exceptional nature of the situations in which they
do not. Clear thinking about the problems posed by promisees who
provide no exchange but can show reliance or a past debt is fostered
by disassociating those problems, in both an analytical and a terminological sense, from the problems which arise out of purported exchanges.
The Washington court does not differentiate between "consideration"
and "sufficient consideration."0' In other particulars its position appears to coincide generally with that of the Restatement. Most significant is its restriction of "consideration" to "something bargained for."
0 the court said: "Yet, beyond
In Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. DeLisle"'
the bare fact of a benefit or detriment, or, more specifically the extension
of further credit, it is fundamental that such must arise out of an agreement beween the parties. There must be a meeting of the minds." In
this passage there is also a reasonably clear statement of the proof by
which conformity to the "bargained-for" requirement shall be established. The critical evidence will be evidence of offer and acceptance.
There is, indeed, no other basis on which the inquiry can be conducted.
Under this approach, a promisee's post-promise and unrequested act or
forbearance cannot be consideration. A promisee who can muster only
this kind of proof would be well advised if he shifted his theory to
promissory estoppel. 09
104 Id. § 19.
105 1d. § 75(1).
101 Id. §§ 76 et seq.

See the discussion at n. 112 et. seq.
47 Wn.2d 318, 287 P.2d 302 (1955). See also Snyder v. Roberts, 45 Wn.2d 865
at p. 869, 278 P.2d 348 (1955) (which cites the Restatement and adopts the "bargainedfor" language of § 75) ; Jenkins v. Jenkins University, 17 Wash. 160, 49 P. 247 (1897)
The separate treatment accorded promises supported by reliance or a prior debt is
apparent in the section which follows, entitled "Informal Contracts Without Assent or
Consideration." The Universitl C.I.T. Corporation case is discussed in Comment, Considerationin Suretryship Contracts in Washington, 31 WAsH. L R-v. 76 at 86 (1956),
it being there suggested that application of the court's formula to the facts before it
would seem to demand a contrary holding on the bargained-for requirement.
109 A good example of an unsuccessful attempt to make the shift is Hill v. Corbett,
33 Wn.2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949), lost for failure to meet all of the requirements for
promissory estoppel. See also n. 119 below. It must be recognized that a promisee
107
108
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The later Washington decisions demonstrate that consideration may
be found in a bargained-for act, forbearance, change in legal relations,
'orpromise."' They also demonstrate that consideration need not move
to the promisor and provide no reason for thinking that consideration
cannot move from a third person."' They further demonstrate a truly
astonishing diversity in word-usage, "valid consideration,""' 2 "sufficient
consideration,""' "adequate consideration,"" 4 "valuable consideration,p i". and "mutuality of obligation""' having been used at one time
or another in addition to or in lieu of, and apparently interchangeably
with, "consideration." The latter has in turn been used where "value"
would perhaps have more precisely expressed the court's purpose.""
The word "consideration" has continued to appear in opinions discussing the enforceability of oral suretyship promises and the main-purpose
Statute of Frauds exception, augmenting the confusion in that already
badly confused area."' Bare promises have continued to elicit "no conwhose response to the promise was an act done for the promisor may be able to show
that the act was proffered as an offer by him, accepted by implication.
110 The decisions are discussed in the subsections which follow.
"'1Johnson v. Savidge, 43 Wn.2d 273, 260 P.2d 1088 (1953) ; Castle & Co. v. Public
Service Underwriters, 198 Wash. 576, 89 P.2d 506 (1939) ; Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash.
451, 93 P.2d 709 (1939). See also Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. DeLisle, 47 Wn.2d 318 at
322, 287 P.2d 302 (1955). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS sec. 75 (2) (1932) provides:
"Consideration may be given to the promisor or to some other person. It may be given
by the promisee or by some other person."
112 Kandoll v. Penttila, 18 Wn2d 434 at 439, 139 P.2d 616 (1943).
113.Cowles Publishing Co. v. vfcMann, 25 Wn.2d 736 at 744, 172 P.2d 235 (1946)
(dissent) ; Fleischbein v. Thorne, 193 Wash. 65 at 72, 74 P.2d 880 (1937) ; A. M. Castle
& Co. v. Public Service Underwriters, 198 Wash. 576 at 590, 89 P.2d 506 (1939).
14 Larkins v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 35 Wn2d 711 at 720, 214 P.2d 700
(1950).
.15 Unternahrer v. Baker, 18 Wn.2d 393 at 396, 139 P.2d 318 (1943).
'Is Larkins v. St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Co., 35 Wn.2d 711 at 719, 720, 214 P.2d
700 (1950); Levas v. Dewey, 33 Wn.2d 232, at 247, 213 P.2d 933 (1949); Mall
Tool Co. v. Far West Equipment Co., 45 Wn.2d 158 at 161, 273 P2d 652 (1954). See
also n. 128 below.
(the problem
"I7 Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wn.2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943)
being whether a renewal note signed by the husband created a community obligation) ;
Haugen v. Raupach, 43 Wn.2d 147, 260 P.2d 340 (1953) (the problem being the validity
of a lien release; it might be inferred from the opinion that consideration is a requisite
for an effective Hen release; the inference is an unfortunate one; consideration is a contract-formation requirement, not a requirement for the accomplishment of a conveyance; a lien release is a type of conveyance.) See also Eder v. Nelson, 41 Wn,2d 58,
247 P.2d 230 (1952) (where the issue was the existence of a principal-surety relationship between the parties; plaintiff, the maker of a note, claimed reimbursement asserting that he was a surety; defendant was the payee and first indorser; the court in
Saying that absence of consideration can be shown between the original parties, and
that whether defendant received consideration for the note was a material issue, unnecessarily complicatd the problem; suretyship status is not to be established by
demonstrating that one party did and the other did not receive consideration; the purpose of the transaction and the intent of the parties is what controls. If the creditor's
performance moved to one party, that is relevant evidence, not because it proves consiedration or the lack of it, but because it sheds light on the intent of the parties.)
'Is Lloyd Co. v. Wyman, 16 Wn.2d 621, 134 P.2d 459 (1943). The court said: "If
appellants made an oral'promise to pay respondent, there is no consideration to support
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sideration" explanations for non-enforcement." 9 In Cowles Publishing
Co. v. McMann,120 the court treated as "bare" a promise which might.
better have been differently regarded. There was in issue a specialized
the promise; hence it is unenforcible." p. 630. See also Fairview Lumber Co. v. Makos,
44 Wn.2d 131, 265 P.2d 837 (1954). The promisee of an oral promise to answer for
another's debt has a double burden, proof of consideration and of conformity to the
peculiar Statute of Frauds proposition known generally as "the main purpose exception." Nothing but obfuscation can come from use of the word "consideration" in attempts to explain or apply the Statute of Frauds exception. The performance of the
promisee will have run to the principal at the surety's request and will have provided
consideration; the oral or written nature of the surety's promise can never be-relevant
to the consideration issue. Whether the surety should be held on his oral promise"
despite the Statute is an inquiry presupposing that the surety is otherwise contractually
obligated. It is an inquiry difficult enough to handle, without talking as though it turns
on the presence of some special variety of consideration. Justification for excluding the
surety from whatever protection the Statute is intended to afford must be found iri
the motive which induced him to bargain for a performance moving to the principal.
See 2 CoRSiN, CoNTRcs §§ 366 et seq. (1950).
210 Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn.2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949); Castle & Co. v. Public
Service Underwriters, 198 Wash. 576, 89 P.2d 506 (1939) (where a creditor's promise
to extend time was held to be gratuitous, Since the extension was requested, in effect,
by the debtor, it is difficult to see why a promise by the debtor to pay interest during
the extension period was not implied; cf. Strong v. Sunset Copper Co., 9 Wn.2d 214,
114 P.2d 526 (1941) ; had it been implied, the debtor's request would have been part
of an offer and the creditor's response would have created a bilateral contract) ; Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. DeLisle, 47 Wn.2d 318, 287 P.2d 302 (1955) (discussed above
at n. 108 and below at n. 120) ; Cowles Publishing Co. v. McMann, 25 Wn.2d 736, 172
P.2d 235 (1946) (discussed below at n. 120) ; Hopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wn.2d 260, 196
P.2d 347 (1948),
12025 Wn.2d 736, 172 P.2d 235, 167 A.L.R. 1164 (1946), noted 4 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 221 (1947); 22 WASH. L. Rav. 142 (1947). See also 6 W.LisTON, CoNRaTCTs
§ 1874 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Comment, Considerationin Suretyship Contracts in Washington, 31 WASH. L. Rrv. 76 (1956) ; Annot., Consideration'forassumption of obligation
as guarantor,surety, indorser or indemnitor, after execution and delivery of principal
contract, as predicable upon an antecedentpromise to assume or furnish such obligation,
167 A.L.R. 1174. Four judges dissented; their opinion appears the better reasoned.
The majority displayed no real awareness of the many decisions (some from Washington) holding the surety on similar facts, nor of the reasoning on which those decisions
rest. The law review discussions cited above infer that the majority opinion is both
ambiguous and illogical. No detailed examination into the precedents can be attempted
here; it may however be suggested that courts are required by cases like Cowles Pub-'
lishing Co. v. McMann to determine whether the bargained-for element in consideration
shall yield to the peculiar necessities of these suretyship transactions, that the bargained-for element is not sacrosanct, that the creditor's reliance on the principal's
promise to procure a surety may well be the most significant element in the facts, that
identification of the prospective surety in the principal's promise has no theoretic or
practical relevance whatsoever, and that if a court deems justice better served by holding the surety, but is unable to bring itself to state a flat rule acknowledging the exceptional character of the consideration problem, there are available various rationales
under which lip service can be done the bargained-for and .contemporaneous concept of
consideration. These are discussed in the text and periodical references cited. In
Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451 at 460, 93 P.2d 709 (1939) the court seemed prepared
to acknowledge a special rule for this type of problem, saying: "If at the time the loan
was made it was the understanding ...that the additional signature of appellant would
be obtained, and it was placed on the note February 11, 1931, by appellant pursuant to
the original agreement, that signing related back to the inception of the original contract ... and no new consideration was necessary." Relation back is as good a ratio
as any, if a special consideration principle is to be framed. The force of the Cowles
Publishing Company case may have been diminished by Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.
v. DeLisle, 47 'Wn.2d 318, 287 P.2d 302 (1955), in which the court said at p. 320:
"However, a guaranty contract executed after the creation of the principal obligation
is supported by a consideration if it is predicated upon an antecedent promise with
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consideration problem encountered in suretyship. Where the principal
receives the credit he desires, and at the time promises to procure a
surety, is the surety's later promise supported by consideration? The
court held "no." The opinion is not persuasive.
The words "benefit" and "detriment" have continued to recur in
Washington decisions, as in the passage quoted above at note 108 from
the UniversalC.I.T. Corp. opinion. Proper evaluation of their function
is not easy. They have survived from an earlier era in which the
principles now comprising "consideration" were emerging. That they
have utility today may be questioned. Any apparent connotation that
consideration always exists where there is "benefit" or "detriment" is
obviously false. The Universal C.I.T. Corp. case and its emphasis of
the bargained-for requirement is demonstrative. Does "bargained-for
benefit or detriment" provide a sound test? It may be sound; it is
certainly useless. No problems can be solved with such a test; for
problem-solving, the conduct which courts will recognize as "benefit"
or "detriment" must be known. Courts will not accept proof of conduct
conforming to the dictionary meanings of "benefit" or "detriment" as
conclusive proof of consideration. These words are used in a technical
and special sense. They indicate something bargained for which satisfies
such substantive law requirements for consideration as appertain in the
jurisdiction. "Benefit" really means nothing more nor less than "consideration"; likewise of "detriment." The important tools for lawyers
and judges are the substantive law requirements; i.e., the propositions
discussed in the subsections which follow. Precision in analysis and
exposition might well be fostered by letting "benefit" and "detriment"
go into retirement. They are not used in the Restatement of Contracts."'
Acts. Acts are a routine source of consideration. The noted Washington cases are illustrative.'22
respect thereto, made as an inducement to the principal obligation, either directly by
the undertaker or by the principal obligor in such a way as to bind him in a legal duty
to the obligee." (Italics added). There is no indication here that the principal must
have identified the surety. This passage is dictum; no promise by the principal to provide a surety was in evidence. Moreover, the court went on to cite and quote from the
Cowles Publishing Company opinion, with no indication of disapproval. The latter,
insofar as it reads, ". . . or the debtor gives the creditor an assurance that, if he later
deems the debt insecure, he might look to a certain person, then named by the debtor.. ." conflicts with the proposition stated in the later case.
121 Moreover, § 81 reads: "Except as this rule is qualified by §§ 76, 78-80, gain or
advantage ot the promisor or loss or disadvantage to the promisee, or the relative
values of a promise and the consideration for it, do not affect the sufficiency of consideration."
2" Fleischbein v. Thorne, 193 Wash. 65, 74 P.2d 880 (1937) (release of a mortgage
held consideration although the statute of limitations had run on obligation secured) ;
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Forbearances. An unfortunate conflict has developed in the Washington cases concerned with forbearance as consideration. Despite the
existence of several prior decisions sustaining the sufficiency of bargained-for forbearance,123 and without mentioning those decisions, the
court in Cowles Publishing Co. v. McMann124 held that "mere forbearance, without an agreement to forbear, is not sufficient." Following this
somewhat casual embracing of a minority doctrine, the reason for which
is obscure and the soundness of which is more than doubtful, 12 Snyder
v. Roberts was decided. 2 There, after summarizing the several lines
of authority which have developed in the United States around forbearance as consideration, the court said of the view which finds consideration in requested forbearance, "We find no Washington cases in [this]
category." Since earlier decisions were not discussed nor expressly
overruled, and the merits of the conflicting principles were not examHopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wn2d 260, 196 P.2d 347 (1948) (cash payment by an optionee) ;
Castle & Co. v. Public Service Underwriters, 198 Wash. 576, 89 P.2d 506 (1939) (sale
of goods to third person) ; Unternahrer v. Baker, 18 Wn.2d 393, 139 P.2d 318 (1943)
(release of interest in a corporation) ; Levas v. Dewey, 33 Wn2d 232, 213 P.2d 933
(1949) (execution of will); Franklin v. Fischer, 34 Wn.2d 342, 208 P.2d 902 (1949)
(payment to a third person); Rogich v. Dressel, 45 Wn.2d 829, 278 P.2d 367 (information conveyed to promisor by promisee; payment by one against whom a claim was
asserted); Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. DeLisle, 47 Wn.2d 318, 287 P.2d 302 (1955)
(dictum, extension of credit to third person).
123 Bank of American etc. Ass'n v. Stotsky, 194 Wash. 246, 77 P.2d 990 (1938)
(forbearance from bidding at a foreclosure sale, from contesting the sale and from
seeking refinancing).; Dittmar v. Frye & Co., 200 Wash. 467, 93 P.2d 717 (1939) (forbearance from pressing collection of a debt). Earlier cases are annotated under § 75
(1) (b), Washington Annotations, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS. See also Palmer & Co.
v. Chaffee, 129 Wash. 408, 225 P. 65 (1924). It must however appear that the promisee
had a right to do what he refrained from doing. Conran v. White & Bollard, Inc., 24
Wn.2d 619, 167 P.2d 133 (1946) (forbearance from redeeming from a tax sale, by
one who had no right to redeem, is not consideration).
124 25 Wn.2d 736 at p. 741, 172 P.2d 235, 167 A.L.R. 1164 (1946), noted 4 WAsH.
& LE L REv. 221 (1947), 22 WASH. L. REv. 142 (1947), discussed in Comment, Consideration in Suretryship Contractsin Washington, 31 WASH. L. REv. 76 (1956). The
opinion does not indicate any request by the promisor for the forbearance in question;
the abvious explanation for a holding of no consideration would be that the forbearance was not bargained-for.
125 Professor Williston said of the view that forbearance must be promised, "The
cases [last] cited fail to recognize the validity of unilateral contracts and assume the
necessity of mutuality of obligation in every contract, whereas such mutuality never
exists in a unilateral contract." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 136 p. 480 n. 4 (rev. ed.
1936). See also 1 Co1niN, CONTRACTS § 137 (1950) ; Annot., Validity of promise conditioned upon forbearance or nonexercise of right, without an agreement or other original
consideration by promisee, 74 A.L.R. 293. The offeree's power to stop forbearing whenever he chooses, the offeror having requested forbearance rather than a promise to forbear, is no reason for denying consideration; the offeree requested to accomplish an act
requiring some continuity of performance has a like power. The proper emphasis is on
the offeror's having obtained what he bargained for.
12 45 Wn.2d 865 at 869, 278 P.2d 348 (1955). Curiously enough, here as in the
Cowles Publishing Company case, the discussion of forbearance as consideration was
unnecessary. The consideration really put in issue by the promisee in Snyder v. Roberts
was relinquishment of a claim, and not forbearance. Moreover, the court had already
disposed of whatever consideration problem there was before it, by reference to the
bargained-for requirement.
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ined,. it seems safe to conclude that the Washington position on the
sufficiency, of forbearance as consideration is presently unpredictable.
Promises. The basic proposition that a promise can be consideration
has been reiterated in several recent opinions."' The word "mutuality"
has been scrutinized and rightly analyzed. 8- It is only a confusing
synonym for "consideration," which in the formation of a bilateral
contract demands an exchange of promises, both of which satisfy the
criteria by which the sufficiency of a promise as consideration is determined. Several decisions dealing with various phases of the illusory
promise problem were decided." 9 They evidence no inclination to depart from the generally accepted rule, under which a promise by which
127 Strong v. Sunset Copper Co., 9 Wn.2d 214, 114 P.2d 526 (1941) ; Sargent v.
Drew-English, Inc., 12 Wn.2d 320, 121 P.2d 373 (1942) ; Auger v. Shideler, 23 Wn.2d
505, 161 P.2d 200 (1945) ; Levas v. Dewey, 33 Wn.2d 232, 213 P.2d 933 (1949) ;
In re Young's Estate, 40 Wn.2d 582, 244 P.2d 1165 (1952) (here the court quoted
from the opinion in Auger v. Shideler, cited above, the curious statement: "The mutual promises would constitute the consideration for the agreement, and the making
of each will would be the consideration for the making of the other." Just what this
means is not at all clear.) Raab v. Wallerich, 46 Wn.2d 375, 282 P.2d 271 (1955). See
also Howell v. Benton, 40 .Wn.2d 871, 246 P.2d 823 (1952).
128 Sargent v. Drew-English, 12 Wn.2d 320, 121 P.2d 373 (1942). See also 1 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 152 (1950). Despite the demonstration in the Sargent case that the word
serves no useful purpose, "mutuality" continues to appear in opinions; the citations
appear in n. 116 above. An illustration of the confusion the term can cause is the statement in Foelkner v. Perkins, 197 Wash. 462 at 466, 85 P2d 1095 (1938) : "It is necessary to deteriine, however, if the oral modification is void because ... of lack of con:sideration and mutuality of obligation, .. ." Passages like this, in which the court
talks as though mutuality were an independent requirement for bilateral contracts,
may tempt counsel to read into "mutuality" ideas about equivalency of performances.
The Sargent Case, cited supra, is possibly an example. Thus a side-wise approach to
the restrictions rejected in cases directly concerned with adequacy (see the discussion
below in the subsection entitled "Adequacy") is encouraged.
129 Although neither case involved a consideration issue, Winslow v. Mell, 48 Wn.2d
581, 295 P.2d 319 (1956) and Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wn.2d 454, 287
P.2d 735 (1955), noted 31 WAsn. L. REv. 107 (1956) contain good definitions of
"illusory promise." In both instances the defendant had made a promise on a condition
within his control; the condition had not been satisfied and liability was denied. In the
Winslow opinion the court said: "One who promises to do a thing only if it pleases
him to do it is not bound to perform it at all, as his promise is illusory." (citing 1 CoRBIN,

CONTRACTS §§ 145, 147). In the Spooner opinion it was said: "A supposed promise

may be illusory because it is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced ...or by reason of
provisions contained in the promise which in effect make its performance optional or
entirely discretionary on the part of the promisor." (citing 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 33). In Washington Chocolate Co. v. Canterbury Candy Makers, Inc., 18 Wn.2d 79,
138 P.2d 195 (1943), a seller's promise to sell at a price to be fixed by him was held
not to be consideration. The vice in such a promise lies in the promisor's power to
raise the price to a point at which the buyer cannot buy, thus relieving the seller of
any burden of selling. In Larkins v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 35 Wn2d 711,
214 P.2d 700 (1950), the stated basis for denying contract formation was lack of consideration. Since the defendant was found not to have made the promise sued on, that
might well have been made the rationale. In Reeker v. Remour, 40 Wn.2d 519, 244
P.2d 270 (1952), a service station lessee's promise to pay as rent one cent per gallon
of gasoline sold was attacked as consideration; a promise like this is illusory if there
be no promise to sell gasoline; a promise to sell was found by implication.
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the promisor reserves to himself complete control over whether he shall
perform is not consideration. 3 '
Antecedent duty. In the view of most American courts, consideration for a promise is not to be found in the promisee's doing or promising
to do something which he was already under a legal duty to the promisor
to do. 1 The operation of this principle in transactions whereby the
promisor was to pay more for a performance to which he was already
entitled, is illustrated in several of the later Washington decisions."' A
few decisions which involved indistinguishable facts were given an
unfortunate variation in result or rationale by virtue of the peculiar
modification principle discussed in the following subsection. 3' Another
type of attack on the antecedent-duty principle was extensively discussed in Snyder v. Roberts,"' and denominated "merger." The scope
and theory of the attack is well enough stated by the court in this
passage: "The execution, delivery, and acceptance of a deed varying
from the terms of the antecedent contract indicates an amendment of
the original contract, and generally the rights of the parties are fixed
by their expressions as contained in the deed."
Even less consistency is found in the Washington cases which deal
with the discharge of prior obligations. Discharge transactions of the
substituted-performance type, usually called "accords" where the original obligation was the product of a unilateral contract or of a bilateral
contract fully performed on one side, are generally required to rest on
something more than part performance of the duty already owed."'
There is some contrary authority and some adherence to the idea that a
debtor who has actually paid the lesser amount is discharged, although
an agreement to pay and to receive the lesser amount would be unenforceable." 6 Washington is in the odd position of having case support
130 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 79 (1932); 1 WILLIST N, CONTRACTS §§ 104
et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 145 et seq. (1950).
13, See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 76(a), 78 (1932) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§§ 120 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 171 et seq. (1950) ; Comment

Note, Performance of work previously contracted for as consideration for promise to
pay greater or additionalamount, 12 A.L.R.2d 78.
132 Queen City Construction Co. v. Seattle, 3 Wn.2d 6,99 P.2d 407 (1940) ; Goodwin
v. Northwestern Mfut. Life Ins. Co., 196 Wash. 391, 83 P.2d 231 (1938) ; Portion Pack,
Inc. v. Bond, 44 Wn.2d 161, 265 P.2d 1045 (1954) ; Snyder v. Roberts, 45 Wn.2d 865,
278 P.2d 348 (1955) ; Harris v. Morgensen, 31 Wn.2d 228, 196 P.2d 317 (1948). Cf.
Thayer v. Brady, 28 ,Vn.2d 767, 184 P.2d 50 (1947) (prior contract unclear concerning
the duty in question; the new agreement was regarded as evidencing the parties' interpretation of the old one as not covering that duty, and was enforced).
"3 See particularly n. 152 below.
134 45 Wn.2d 865, 278 P.2d 348 (1955).
136 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 120 (rev. ed. 1936); 1 CORBIN, CoNTRACTs §§ 174
et seq., 183 (1950).
136 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 120 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 175, 184
(1950).
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for all three of these propositions: that the promise to discharge is
inoperative, that it is operative, and that it is operative if the debtor
has paid the part. The cases have been well discussed in preceding
issues of this Review."' Attention is particularly directed to Bellingham SecuritiesSyndicate, Inc. v. Bellingham Coal Mines"' in which the
court said flatly: "Where a debtor pays what in law he is bound to pay
and what he admits that he owes, such payment by the debtor and its
acceptance by the creditor ... can not operate as an accord and satisfaction of the entire indebtedness, as there is an absence of consideration
therefor." Meyer v. Strom". contains similar language. A contrary
result was reached in the Douglas County Memorial Hospital Ass'n
case. 4 ' There the creditor was held "estopped" to deny consideration,
and the court discussed favorably some earlier cases in which a creditor
who had received a reduced payment was refused recovery of the difference between the original obligation and the sum paid. 4 '
It is not surprising that antecedent-duty controversies have produced
so much confusion. There are cogent arguments both for and against
an undeviating adherance to the view which denies that consideration
can be provided in a performance already owed. If an obligor can, in a
legally effective maneuver, exact more pay for the rendition of his performance, or buy a discharge by paying part of what he owes, the whole
economic structure is arguably weakened. That structure rests very
much on the notion that contract obligations should be performed and
will be legally enforced. The availability of legal machinery making
such conduct profitable would encourage gouging and defaults for the
purpose of forcing settlements. On the other hand, many a creditor on
occasion faces salvage operations made necessary by the financial difficulties of an honest debtor. The creditor is the best judge of how such
an operation should be conducted. There should be no legal impediment to the implementation of the arrangements he voluntarily makes
with his debtor. Even in instances of a promise to pay more for the
same performance, there is sometimes something to be said for the
obligor who exacted the extra pay. He may, by reason of unforeseen
and uncontrollable difficulties, be able to ask for additional compensa137

Comment, The Doctrine of Foakes v. Beer in Washington, 16 WASH. L. REv. 42

(1941); Note, 30 WASH. L. REv. 104 (1955).
138 13 Wn.2d 370 at 386, 125 P.2d 668 (1942).

"3937 Wn.2d 818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951).
14045 Wn.2d 784, 278 P.2d 330 (1954), noted 30 WAsH. L. REv. 104 (1955).
'141 E.g. Vigelius v. Vigelius, 169 Wash. 190, 13 P.2d 425 (1932) ; Conlan v. Spokane
Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921). See also Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wn.2d
818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951) and Johnson v. Peterson, 43 Wn.2d 816, 264 P.2d 237 (1953).
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tion without impinging on any but the most sensitive of ethical standards. Between him and the callous blackmailer of a necessitous obligee
there is a considerable difference.
Even in one state the litigation can illustrate a wide range of ethical
overtones. The Douglas County Memorial Hospital4 2 case involved a
settlement proposed by the hospital, which was informed concerning
the debtor's financial condition and knew he was not able to pay its
bill in full and in cash. Inman v. Roche Fruit Co.'4 ' involved a promise
by a buyer to pay the same price for a lesser performance; the rearrangement was apparently solicited by the buyer for reasons deemed
advantageous to it. The transaction litigated in Portion Pack, Inc. v.
Bond' 4 was an outright gouge as the court saw it; that litigated in
Snyder v. Roberts" was about as bad. That litigated in Goodwin v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co."' seems more probably the product of
a mistake by the insurance company concerning its legal position. 4 '
Can and should courts police bargains like these on a case-to-case
basis? It would certainly be difficult to frame an antecedent-duty doctrine flexible enough to encompass all of the possible ethical nuances.
The court can move either way in future litigation, simply because it
has announced contradictory propositions and can ground a decision
either way on Washington precedent. This fact must considerably
complicate the work of counsel in advising clients and in briefing. It
defeats the commentator, who finds in this area more than normal
difficulty in arriving at any solid basis for predicting the future course
of the court.
Modification agreements. The subject matter of this subsection
merits separate treatment only because Washington has a group of
cases involving transactions characterized by the court as "modifications." These cases are a tangle of diverse language and results. The
origins of the trouble lie in early decisions, reference to which is
accordingly necessary.
Preliminarily, some discussion of the ways in which a contract can
be changed seems necessary. It is believed that most American courts
would accept the following analysis:
If the parties to a bilateral contract still wholly or partly executory
on both sides agree to terminate their remaining duties, the new tran42

See n. 140 above.

1413
See n. 151 and 152 below.
144 Supra n. 132.

145 There was no dispute when the questioned transaction was effected. The extent
to which disputes preclude application of the antecedent-duty rule is discussed below
in the subsection entitled "Compromise."
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saction is a contract and is usually called "mutual rescission." Consideration is provided in the surrender by each party of his rights under
the original contract. Rescission can be partial, affecting one pair of
several reciprocal rights. 48
If the parties to a bilateral contract still executory on both sides agree
that one party shall perform in a different way, consideration for the
new agreement is provided in his promise to render the different performance and in surrender by the other party of his right to receive the
original performance. If the new agreement contemplates a performance by each differing from that originally undertaken, consideration
is provided in the new promises. But if one party undertakes to do less
than he originally promised, or to do more than he originally promised,
while the other is to perform according to the original contract, there
is an antecedent-duty problem, and the new agreement will fail for
lack of consideration. 46a
If the parties to a unilateral contract or a bilateral contract fully
performed on one side agree that the obligor shall perform in a different
way, there is no consideration impediment to enforcement of the new
promise; the new transaction will usually be termed an "accord.'.
The antecedent-duty rule, however, again comes into operation if the
new agreement contemplates discharge of the obligor upon his accomplishing only a part of his original obligation.148 A promise by the
obligor to do more than he was obligated to do would also be a "bare"
promise and unenforceable.
The new transaction must stand on its own feet. For any new promise
there must be consideration, bargained-for and hence contemporaneous
or future, and satisfying such other requirements as the jurisdiction
exacts. There is no way in which the existence of the original contract
can furnish consideration for the change and no way in which the
original consideration can carry over and support the subsequent promise. No sensible attack can be made on the consideration issues presented by a new agreement purporting to change a prior contract
without first determining what rights and duties, created by the prior
contract, were extant when the new agreement was undertaken, nor
without determining the ways in which those rights and duties were to
be affected by the new agreement.
.466

(1950).
146a

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

6

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

84c (1932).

§

1826 (rev. ed. 1936); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS

§

1826 (rev. ed. 1936);

§

1236

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

147 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1268 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
148 6 Wn.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 1851 (rev. ed. 1936).

84C (1932).

§

19591

CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON

Prior to 1937 the court, in disposing of various cases involving transactions of the types discussed above, said that no new consideration
was necessary for the new agreement. In several instances, starting
with Tingley v. Fairkaven Land Co., there was consideration in fact,
and the result reached was sound.14 In Stofferan v. Depew,0 however,
the court's erroneous formula led to an unsupportable result; the obligor
under a unilateral contract was held liable on a substituted contract
broadening his obligation with no new consideration. Only a little less
objectionable was the result reached in Inman v. Roche Fruit Co.,'
where the defendant was held on its subsequent promise to pay the
same price for a lesser performance by the plaintiff."'O
Meanwhile there was developing a parallel line of authority which
149 Tingley v. Fairhaven Land Co., 9 Wash. 34, 36 Pac. 1098 (1894) (contract to sell
logs; later agreement to change the delivery point and reduce the price. The new
agreement was held effective and treated as "abrogating" the original contract; the
court also said the change could be effected "without the actual payment of any consideration." This erroneous statement was totally unnecessary; it seems to have been the
cause of the present confusion, having been repeated without critical examination or
any apparent awareness that there was consideration in the Tingley transaction) ; Long
v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. 330, 61 Pac. 142 (1900) (involved waiver of a construction
contract clause making written notice of extras a requisite to recovery for them; in
sustaining the waiver the court said in answer to the owner's objection that it received
no consideration for the waiver, "no independent consideration was necessary" for a
modification agreement. The analysis underlying this language is patently faulty;
moreover, for waiver of an express condition no new contract is needed); Dyer v.
Middle Kittitas Irr. Dist, 25 Wash. 80, 64 Pac. 1009 (1901) (mutual rescission of a
bilateral contract still partly executory on both sides; the new agreement was
sustained. By way of explanation the court said: "... . [I]t is sufficient to say the
agreement required no new or independent consideration," and cited the Tingley and
Long cases, with several cases from elsewhere. Here again there was routine consideration in the reciprocal surrender of rights under the original contract; it is assumed
the owner was not already in material default on the original contract) ; Sunset Copper
Co. v. Black, 115 Wash. 132, 196 Pac. 640 (1921) (formula used, unnecessarily);
LaPlante v. Hubbard, 125 Wash. 621, 217 Pac. 20 (1923) (agreement to "cancel" the
executory part of a bilateral contract still partly executory on both sides; the court
said: "The second agreement was a new contract, taking the place of the first, which
had not been executed by either of the parties, and the first was a sufficient consideration for the second." The Tingley, Dyer and Long cases were cited. That there was
consideration in the reciprocal surrender of rights under the original contract seems
clear; that the original could supply consideration for the second contract seems obviously impossible; that the new contract discharged rather than replaced the old one
seems evident) ; Winn v. Stanton, 146 Wash. 328, 262 Pac. 645 (1928) (formula used,
although consideration existed).
15079 Wash. 170, 139 Pac. 1084 (1914). The court said: "The substitution of a new
contract for an old one, in itself constitutes a sufficient consideration," citing the Long
case discussed in the preceding note.
151 162 Wash. 235, 298 Pac. 342 (1931).
152 After distinguishing Wright v. Tacoma (see n. 153 below), the court placed its
reliance in Long v. Pierce County (see n. 149 above), which was cited for the proposition that "the contract, when modified by the subsequent oral agreement, is substituted
for the contract as originally made, and the original consideration attaches to and supports the modified contract." The court has here confused two problems. Taken at
face value, the promise of Roche Fruit Co. to pay the same price and also pack and
clean the fruit was a bare promise supported by nothing. The most the sellers can
argue by way of consideration ,as a new promise by them to deliver the fruit. This
fails as consideration because the sellers were already obligated to deliver the fruit.
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accords with the thinking of other courts. In Wright v. Tacoma5 " the
court said: "There is no doubt of the rule that a subsequent agreement,
which does not form any part of the original contract, is of no force or
validity unless supported by a new consideration." In Tacoma &
EasternLumber Co. v. Field & Co.,'""a bilateral contract to sell lumber
and to provide an inspection certificate was performed by the seller;
his later promise to procure another inspection was held to be unenforceable. The court said:
The rule is that, while a contract remains executory on both sides,
an agreement to annul on one side is a consideration for the agreement
to annul on the other; but that, if the contract has been executed on
one side, an agreement without a new consideration that it shall not be
binding is without consideration and void. 55
In Hunters Cattle Co. v. Carstens Packing Co.,"' a contract to feed
cattle by feeding cut hay in feed boxes for a price stated, still partly
unperformed on both sides, was held to have been successfully modified
by a new agreement calling for a different mode of feeding and payment
Had the original contract been rescinded, the antecedent duty difficulty would not exist.
There is some authority for the idea that the making of the later agreement is itself
proof of implied intent to rescind the original contract. See Evans v. Oregon & Washington R. Co., 58 Wash. 429, 108 Pac. 1095 (1910) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 130A
(rev. ed. 1936), in which these cases are critically discussed; and 1 CORBIN, CONTRAcTS
§ 186 (1950). If it be assumed the original contract was rescinded, the new agreement
consists of an exchange of promises-by the buyer, to buy, pay, sort and clean; by the
seller, to deliver. These promises are consideration and there is a contract. To say the
original consideration attaches to and supports the "modification" is both unnecessary
and illogical. If the court in the Inman case meant by its words "substituted for the
contract as originally made" to say it regarded the original contract as rescinded by
inference, it went beyond the Evans case, which would support inferred rescission only
where breach of the original contract had occurred or was threatened. See Smith Sand
& Gravel Co. v. Corbin, 102 Wash. 306,173 Pac. 16 (1918).
1'3 87 Wash. 334, 151 Pac. 837 (1915). The words "does not form any part of the
original contract" are not clear; the court sustained a new agreement by which a contractor surrendered his right to claim an extra for work done under a construction
contract and the owner undertook to pay for certain other work; the quoted language
was part of a discussion of consideration, which the owner said was necessary and
lacking, and which the court conceded was necessary but found to exist. In the Inman
case, n. 151 and 152 above, the court said in countering the Wright case, cited by
counsel, "there is no question but that the subsequent agreement forms part of the
original contract in writing." There is no discernible rational basis on which to determine what the court meant by "part of the original contract." Why a promise to pay
more for the same fruit is such a part, while a promise to forego a right to extras or
pay for additional work is not, is quite undeterminable. Since the consideration supporting the original transaction cannot on any logical basis support the subsequent
agreement, the attempt to distinguish between what is a "pare' and what is not a
"part" seems a particularly unfortunate waste of energy.
1'4 100 Wash. 79, 170 Pac. 360 (1918).
155 The Long case, discussed at n. 149 above, was distinguished as involving a new
agreement made while the original contract remained executory on both sides. See
also n. 169 below.
156 129 Wash. 377, 225 Pac. 68 (1924).
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of the same price.'1 7 In Stauffer v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,' 2
a promise to pay compound interest on a policy loan was held unenforceable because the policy provided for simple interest. The court said:
"The rule is well settled in this state that, if a contract has been executed
by one of the parties thereto, it cannot be modified except by an agreement supported by new consideration.""'
On recapitulation of the pre-1937 situation, it is found that the
Stofferan case cannot be reconciled in either approach or result with the
Tacoma & EasternLumber Co. and Stauffer cases. The recognition in
the Tacoma & EasternLumber Co. and Hunters Cattle Co. cases (and
possibly in Wright v. Tacoma) of consideration in the surrender of
rights under the prior contract is incompatible with the notion expressed
in the Tingley case and its successors, that the mere existence of the
prior contract, or the original consideration, supports the new agreement. The court had said new consideration was necessary for an
agreement changing a prior contract and had said new consideration
was not necessary. "Modification" was used without discrimination in
discussing agreements for the change or discharge of a prior contract.
The later cases have done nothing to clarify the situation. In Foelkner v. Perkins'6 ' the court sustained an agreement by which the vendor
under a prior real estate contract was permitted to collect rents on part
of the property in return for his undertaking (apparently) not to require
the installment payments stipulated in the original contract. The result
is sound; each party made a new promise, and neither promise was infected with any antecedent duty limitations. In explaining its conclusion, the court both recognized this consideration and repeated the
Wright case formula.
In Queen City Construction Co. v. Seattle,' a promise to pay more
for the same work was correctly analyzed, and enforcement was refused,
although the contract was partly executory on both sides when the new
promise was made.
In Exeter v. Martin,Ltd. 6 ' the court sustained mutual rescission of a
lease still partly executory, saying: "The relinquishment ... of their
15 The court did however cite the La Plante case, discussed in n. 149 above, saying
that it "and others therein cited, plainly indicate that this court has consistently held
to this view of the law." Since the feeder undertook to render a different performance,
the La Plante case was not in point.
158 184 Wrash. 431, 51 P.2d 390 (1935).
169 Citing the Tacoma & Eastern Lumber Co., and Hunters Cattle Co. cases. See
notes 154, 156 above.
1Co 197 Wash. 462, 85 P.2d 1095 (1938).
1313 Wvn.2d 6, 99 P.2d 407 (1940).
162-5 XWn.2d 244, 105 P.2d 83 (1940). For this sound result the court cited the La
Plante case (n. 149 above) and the Hunters Cattle Company case (n. 156 above).
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mutual rights under the lease is sufficient consideration to support the
agreement of surrender."
In Hopkins v. Barlin'8 ' an optionee tried to recover the sum he had
paid for the option, alleging a promise by the optioner to return it to
him. In denying recovery the court stressed the absence of any consideration for the alleged promise and repeated the Tacoma & Eastern
Lumber Co. case formula.
In these cases the court reached sound results on sound statements
of normal consideration principles. But in Meyer v. Strom,' in sustaining a lessor's promise to reduce the rental stipulated in a lease, the court
reverted to its earlier erroneous doctrine, saying "the original consideration was sufficient to support the subsequent modification." " ' Neither
the result nor the reasoning can be reconciled with the Queen City Construction Co. case."'
Snyder v. Roberts'8 7 involved a vendor who had been fully paid pursuant to a real estate contract and had inserted in his deed a covenant
obligating the vendee-grantee to a new undertaking. Enforcement of
the new undertaking, as a modification, was refused by the court. This
was sound. But in disposing of the vendor's argument for adherence to
the language of the La Plante case, one of those following the Tingley
case, ...
the court distinguished the earlier decision on its facts and thus
indirectly approved its faulty analysis and language. 9
In Nielsen v. Nortkern Equity Corp.,"' the court sustained an agreement reducing the price stipulated in a prior contract, saying: "Since
the earnest-money agreement was executory on both sides, no new or
additional consideration was necessary to make the modification agree163 31 Wn.2d 260, 196 P.2d 347 (1948).

16437
Wn.2d 818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951).
8
' 5 Citing the Hunters Cattle Co. and Inman cases.
116 The court also relied on the fact the reduced rental had been paid. For this there
is some support. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 130 p. 450 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Vigelius v.
Vigelius, 169 Wash. 190, 13 P.2d 425 (1932) (cited in the Meyer opinion) ; Fuller v.
Deacon, 172 Wash. 489, 20 P.2d 843 (1933) ; Conlon v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117
Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921); Johnson v. Peterson, 43 Wn.2d 816, 264 P.2d 237
(1953).
187 45 Wn.2d 865, 278 P.2d 348 (1955).
168Discussed in n. 149 above.
169 The court cited the Tacoma & Eastern Lumber Co., Stauffer and Hopkins cases.
In its apparent approval of the erroneous proposition stated in the La Plante case as to
contracts still executory, the court encouraged future resort to that unfortunate proposition. Moreover, the court perpetuated the misleading phrasing used in the La Plante
case: "As is made clear therein, the rule of that case is applicable only to the modification of executory contracts." The court must have meant "bilateral contracts not fully
performed on both sides" in its phrase "executory contract" The transaction before it
was executory until the deed was issued; a unilateral contract, e.g., a promissory note,
is an executory contract until it is paid.
170 47 Wn.2d 171, 286 P.2d 1031 (1955).
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ment enforcible." Here again the court reached back into the Tingley
case line of precedents for its authority, ignoring entirely the contrary
decisions. 1
The post-1937 cases have merely extended the conflicting lines of
authority previously developed.
Since the existing confusion in this area is a compound of several
elements, clarification will come only if several corrective measures are
taken. There are conflicting statements of principle, that an agreement
purporting to change a prior contract requires new consideration, that
it does not, and that it does not if the prior contract is "executory."
This conflict can be obviated only by repudiating the first, or the second
and third of these propositions. It is certainly to be hoped that the
court will adopt the view which requires the new agreement to meet the
usual consideration requirements. There are cases conflicting in result,
a situation which can be remedied only by overruling one or the other.
The Stofferan case 7 . is a likely prospect for overruling. The Inman7 '
and Nielsen1 4 cases merit re-examination; they may or may not withstand critical scrutiny. Viewed as violations of the antecedent duty
rule, they should fall. If, in the making of the subsequent agreement,
evidence enough of intent to rescind the original contract can be found,
the antecedent duty difficulty will be cured. Whether such intent should
ever be inferred in this context is a collateral problem which justifies
careful review. Part of the confusion in analysis is the product of
failure to differentiate between the various types of change-transactions.
Consistent recognition of the diverse consideration problems presented
by mutual rescissions, accords, agreements requiring one party to do
more for the same pay, or to perform as originally undertaken, for less
pay, and agreements requiring both parties to perform differently, will
be necessary if consistent results are to be achieved in future litigation.
Compromise. The type of discharge agreement called a "compromise" raises some consideration problems which are the concern here.
What the obligor did or promised pursuant to the compromise may be
attacked as consideration for the promised discharge by invoking the
171 See n. 149 above. The La Plante, Hunters Cattle Co. and Meyer cases were
cited. The fallacious notion that for the modification of a contract no new consideration
is needed, "as the original consideration attached to and supported" it, was also given
a further lease on life in Conran v. White & Bollard, Inc., 24 Wn.2d 619, 167 P.2d 133
(1946), in which the doctrine was approved although application of it was refused on
the particular facts before the court. Concerning implied rescission, which might support the result of the Nielsen case, see n. 152 above.
172 See n. 150 above.
173 See n. 151 above.
174 See n. 170 above.
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antecedent-duty rule; the attack will fail if the existence or extent of
the alleged prior duty was disputed.'
The critical detail is the test
which courts will apply in determining whether it was "disputed." The
obligee's promise to discharge the obligor may be attacked as consideration for the promised payment by asserting that the obligee really had
no claim. 6 Here the critical detail is the test which courts will apply
in determining whether the surrender of an asserted clam is consideration.
There are questions common to both inquiries. Will the bald assertion by an obligor that he owes nothing or has a defense or counterclaim
create a "dispute"? Will the bald assertion by the claimant that he has
a claim be enough to give him something he can sell? Should the court
inquire into the facts and, if so, how far? Is there protection enough
against fabricated defenses and fabricated claims in a standard requiring only good faith? Would a standard requiring reasonableness be
preferable? How can good faith be determined without considering
reasonableness? How can either good faith or reasonableness be determined without some attention to the facts on which the claim or defense
was grounded? As to these matters there is much confusion in the
language of the opinions of other courts and little information as to
how the differing language really works in application. The later
Washington cases are also not definitive.' 7 It is reasonably clear that
most courts, including Washington's, will not require a showing that the
defense or claim actually existed in law and fact; so rigorous a standard
would discourage compromises.
Concerning the discharge of an obligation disputed in part, a clearcut split of American authority has developed where the obligor paid
only the sum he admitted owing.'
The court in Bellingham Securities
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 76
CONTRACTS
176 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 76

15

(rev. ed. 1936); 1 CORBIN,

(a), 78 (1932) ; 1 WLLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 128
§§ 187, 188 (1950).
(b), 78 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 135

(rev. ed. 1936); 1 CORIN, CONTRACTS §§ 140, 141 (1950).

177Disputed obligations: Bellingham Securities Syndicate v. Bellingham Coal
Mines, 13 Wn2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942) ; Hynes v. Hynes, 28 Wn.2d 660, 184 P.2d
68 (1947) ; Sprague Ave. Inv. Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp., 5 Wn.2d 301, 105 P.2d 28
(1940). Claims: Sweeney v. Sweeny Inv. Co., 199 Wash. 135, 90 P.2d 716 (1939);
ones v. Reese, 191 Wash. 16, 70 P.2d 811 (1937) ; Opitz v. Hayden, 17 Wn.2d 347, 135
P.2d 819 (1943) ; In re Witte's Estate, 25 Wn.2d 487, 171 P.2d 183 (1946) ; Cokelet
v. Philpott, 40 Wn.2d 642, 245 P.2d 469 (1952) ; Bellingham v. Whatcom County, 40
Wn.2d 669, 245 P.2d 1016 (1952) ; Johnson v. S. L. Savidge, Inc., 43 Wn.2d 273, 260
P.2d 1088 (1953); Rogich v. Dressel, 45 Wn.2d 829, 278 P.2d 367 (1954); United
Truck Lines v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 44 Wn.2d 520, 268 P.2d 1014 (1954) ; Snyder
v. Roberts, 45 Wn,2d 865, 278 P.2d 348 (1955).
178 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 129 (rev. ed. 1936); 1 COR IN, CONTRACTS § 187
(1950).
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Syndicate, Inc. v. Bellingham Coal Mines 79 continued its adherence to
the view which refuses to find consideration in such a payment.
Adequacy. In Rogich v. Dressel' s the court reaffirmed its reluctance
to engraft onto consideration a requirement that exchanges be of equal
values.
Partial insufficiency. Luther v. National Bank of Commerce 181
brought to the court an unusually interesting example of consideration
sufficient in part and insufficient in part. The contract was sustained." 2
INFORMAL CONTRACTS WITHOUT ASSENT OR CONSIDERATION

Tolling the statute of limitations. In the Washington cases decided
before 1937, there were inconsistencies in the court's pronouncements
about the theory on which tolling rests and conflicting expressions about
the evidence requisite to establish tolling. It was not possible to determine whether a new promise to pay (or a part payment or an acknowledgement) created a new contract or merely prevented assertion of the
statute as a defense to an action on the old obligation. 183 The cases
since 1937 have not clarified the theory; the court has continued to state
several incompatible theories: that a new promise or acknowledgement
made before that statute has run "vitalizes" the old debt;... that a
payment made after the statute has run "revives" the debt; 85 that
170 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942). See also Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wn.2d 818 at
823, 226 P.2d 218 (1951).
18045 Wn.2d 829, 278 P.2d 367 (1954). See also Foelkner v. Perkins, 197 Wash.
462 at 467, 85 P.2d 1095 (1938) ; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 81 (1932) ; I WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 115 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 127 (1950). Heideman v.
Tall's Travel Shops, Inc., 192 Wash. 513, 73 P.2d 1323 (1937) may appear to be in
conflict. In deciding for the promisor in an action involving a promise to employ for
life the court said the promisee provided no consideration save his services. If services
cannot be consideration for promises to pay the going wage and to employ for life, a
standard resembling adequacy is exacted. It is doubtful that the court meant to create
a special consideration principle for life employment transactions. There has developed
elsewhere a curious inclination to turn issues of interpretation or definiteness, presented by alleged promises to employ for life, on the presence or absence of a separate
consideration. See Annot. Validity and duration of contract purporting to be for permanent employment, 35 A.L.R. 1432, supp. 135 A.L.R. 646. The primacy of the interpretation issue in these cases is more apparent in Gensman v. West Coast Power Co., 3
Wn.2d 404, 101 P.2d 316 (1940). See also I WILLISTON op. cit. § 39; 1 CoRnIN op. cit.
§ 96.
1812 Wn.2d 470, 98 P.2d 667 (1940), noted 16 WASH. L. ZEv. 49 (1941).
182 Plaintiff promised two performances; both were rendered; one was successfully
attacked, under the antecedent duty rule; the other was held sufficient to support the
contract. This result seems to be the expectable one. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
84(b) (1932) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 134 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CoIIN, CONTRACTS

§126
(1950).
183 The cases are

discussed in Palmer, Moral obligation as considerationfor a promise in W~ashington, 10 WASH. L. REv. 181 at 187 et seq. (1935).
181 Cannavina v. Poston, 13 Wn.2d 182, 124 P.2d 787 (1942) (quoting from Wood
on Limitations).
385 Blodgett v. Orton, 14 Wn.2d 270, 127 P.2d 671 (1942).
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a part payment is an acknowledgement from which arises a new implied
promise "supported by the original consideration."' 86 and that "moral
obligations arising from, or connected with, what was once a legal liability which has since become suspended or barred by the operation of
a positive rule of law will furnish a consideration for a subsequent
executory promise.' 87 The court's failure to steer a straight course
through this area is astonishing, in the light of Washington's statutory
coverage of tolling and the availability of a reasonably consistent
common-law background against which to construe the statutes."'
Common-law precedents adequately support the key propositions: that
a prior debt is reason enough to enforce a subsequent promise to pay it;
that a debt survives despite the operation of a limitations statute, which
only affects the remedy; and that a part payment or an acknowledgment
of a debt evidences a promise to pay it.'89
Having no firm base in theory, the court has been unable to achieve
consistency in resolving the tolling controversies which have reached
it. There developed, before 1937, conflicting lines of authority about
acknowledgments. One group of cases adhered to the majority view,
under which an acknowledgment that debt exists tolls the statute.""
The other group seemingly rejected this method of tolling, the court
having said: "[A] mere acknowledgment of a debt, or the expression
of an intention to pay, is not sufficient to revive the debt."'' The court
may have meant in this passage only to express a conclusion about the
sufficiency of the creditor's evidence of the acknowledgment. Its
language rejected the acknowledgment as a source of tolling. The
later cases have not resolved the conflict.1'

2

18 6 Easton v. Bigley, 28 Wn.2d 674, 183 P.2d 780 (1947) (quoting from Arthur &
Co. v. Burke, 83 Wash. 690, 145 Pac. 974). See also Cannavina v. Poston, n. 184 above
and Kandoll v. Penttila, n. 204 below.
187 Opitz v. Hayden, 17 Wn.2d 347, 135 P.2d 819 (1943).
188 RCW 4.16.270 says flatly that upon a part payment the limitations period begins
to run anew; RCW 4.16.280 is in form a statute of frauds, requiring written evidence of
a promise to pay or acknowledgement of a prior debt; the legislature evidently contemplated enforcement of a promise or acknowledgement which satisfies the statute.
189 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 143, 160 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 211, 214 et seq. (1950). Although many courts continue to say the original
obligation is consideration for the new promise, the RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 86
(1932) attempted to avoid complications in defining "consideration" by stating the new
promise to be enforceable without consideration.
190 E.g. Griffin v. Lear, 123 Wash. 191, 212 Pac. 271 (1923). See Comment, The
written acknowledgement: its effect on the operation of the Statute of Limitations, 15
WASH. L. REV. 112 (1940); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 86(2) (a) (1932); 1 WndisTON, CONTRACTS §§ 162, 163 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 216 (1950).
19 E.g. Tucker v. Guerrier, 170 Wash. 165, 15 P.2d 936 (1932).
192 In Dolby v. Fisher, 1 Wn.2d 181, 95 P.2d 369 (1939) the Tucker case, n. 191
above, was followed. The court approved an instruction by the trial court, worded:
"In order to remove the bar of the statute of limitations, a new promise must be clear,
distinct, unequivocal, certain and unambiguous. A mere acknowledgement of a debt or
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In several of the older cases, the court purported to require "clear
and unequivocal" proof that the obligor intended to "keep alive the
debt.'.. 3 Two later opinions have repeated this language with approval.' Taken literally, this would require the creditor to prove both
the promise or part payment or acknowledgment and intent by the
debtor to be bound despite the defense afforded him by the limitations
statute. 1"I Whether literal application of this formula is likely cannot
be determined; these cases have at least confused the situation. The
approach of courts generally,' and of Washington's in other cases,'
an expression of an intention to pay is insufficient to revive the debt." Faced with such
an instruction, a jury would seem unable to find tolling save where promissory words
were used by the debtor. Moreover, the cumulative effect of "clear, distinct, unequivocal, certain and unambiguous" must have had some impact on the jury's deliberations;
why this baggage should be added to the word "promise" is most obscure. There is language in the Dolby opinion suggesting that the court felt the letter in question to be
no acknowledgment. Even so, the instruction should have been disapproved. In Cannavina v. Poston, 13 Wn.2d 182, 124 P.2d 787 (1942) the court followed the Lear case,
n. 190 above, and demonstrated no awareness of the conflict between it and cases such
as Tucker v. Guerrier, n. 191 above. Cannavina v. Poston would appear to represent
the view most likely to prevail when the court in some future litigation sets about
straightening out the muddle. Under that view the fact issue-what words are an
acknowledgment, will continue to plague the practioner. There is language in Griffin
v. Lear, n. 190 above, indicating that statements made after the statute has run will
be less liberally interpreted than will statements made before the statute has run. It is
hard to see any logic in this approach. The obligor's words will either fairly mean
"I recognize this obligation exists," or they will not; the time at which the words were
spoken is not relevant to the determination of their meaning.
193 Arthur & Company v. Burke, 83 Wash. 690, 145 Pac. 474 (1915) ; Berteloot v.
Remillard, 130 Wash. 587, 228 Pac. 690 (1924) ; Abrahamson v. Paysse, 159 Wash. 516,
293 Pac. 985 (1930). Stockdale v. Horlacher, 189 Wash. 264, 64 P.2d 1015 (1937).
'04 Walker v. Sieg, 23 Wn.2d 552, 161 P.2d 542 (1945) ; Easton v. Bigley, 28 Wn.2d
674, 183 P.2d 780 (1947).
105 The cases, cited n. 193 and 194 above, involved credits on the obligation not made
on account of direct payments by the obligor (Arthur & Company v. Burke, proceeds
of property the court regarded as collateral; Berteloot v. Remillard, transfer in trust
for the benefit of creditors, income distributed by the trustees to creditors; Abrahamson
v. Paysse, small amount of goods sold on credit by the obligor to the obligee, who credited the sales price on the obligor's old debt; Stockdale v. Horlacher, payments made
by one co-debtor, credited to both; Walker v. Sieg, supplies delivered to the obligee by
the obligor, under circumstances suggesting they were gifts; Easton v. Bigley, proceeds of pledged collateral). It would appear that in each case the only issue was one
of fact-did the obligor make a payment? In each a complete answer could have been
stated in a finding that he did not. The court's language purports to state a rule of
law-nothing short of "clear and unequivocal" proof of "intent to revive the debt" will
suffice to toll the statute.
101 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 174 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CoRniN, Co RAcTs
§217
0 (1950).
1 7 E.g. Cannavina v. Poston, 13 Wn.2d 182, 124 P.2d 787 (1942); Wickwire v.

Reard, 37 Wn.2d 748, 226 P.2d 192 (1951). See also Hein v. Forney, 164 Wash. 309,
2 P.2d 741 (1931) and the court's statement: ...
[I]n the case of part payment, the
recognition and intent to revive is an inference the law raises from the part payment."
Cf. Keen v. O'Rourke, 48 Wn.2d 1, 290 P.2d 976 (1955) and the trial court's instruction, to which the obligor did not except and which accordingly was not in issue on the
appeal: "... [Y]ou must find that it (the part payment) was made under such circumstances as to show an intentional acknowledgement by the debtor of his liability for the
whole debt as of the date of payment.' Just what the word "intentional" is expected to
mean in this context is most obscure. The coupling of "acknowledgment" and "liability"
seems improper; it is acknowledgement of the obligation's existence rather than of
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has been to regard a new promise, whether express or inferred from a
part payment or acknowledgment, as proof enough.
An apparent conflict in early cases concerning the admissibility and
probative value of endorsements or book credits, made by the obligee
and ostensibly reflecting payments made by the obligor, was examined
and much clarified in Wickwire v. Reard.' 8 The court adopted the
view under which the evidence is admissible and sufficient to make out
a prima facie case on the fact of payment if there is collateral proof
showing the endorsement or credit was made before the limitations
period ran out. Presumably the evidence would be inadmissible if the
endorsement or credit was made after the limitations period ran out.
Several other post-1937 cases are significant. In Cannavina v.
Poston 9 the debtor argued that his alleged acknowledgment should
not toll the statute because it was really a proposal to compromise the
creditor's claim. The court conceded the soundness of the argument
but found it irrelevant, there having been no dispute between the parties
when the acknowledgment was made."'0
RCW 4.16.280, which demands a writing signed by the debtor in
proof of a promise or acknowledgment, was construed in two cases.
Strong v. Sunset Copper Co.2"' held it inapplicable to a contract, made
before the limitations period ran out, to extend the maturity date of the
obligation. Campbell Co. v. Holsum Baking Co."' held it inapplicable
to a contract whereby the obligee promised not to plead the statute of
limitations if suit was subsequently brought. Since a new promise to
pay, resting on contemporaneous consideration, is not an instance of
tolling, these decisions seem entirely sound." 3 Less obviously right was
2 4 of the same reasoning to an
the application in Kandoll v. Penttila
extension contract, the subject matter of which was a judgment. After
the enactment in 1929 of the legislation now known as RCW 4.56.210,
"liability" which is usually deemed requisite. "Liability," with its overtones of legal
duty, goes far beyond the inferred promise to pay, from which the acknowledgement
properly derives its tolling effect.
19837 Wn.2d 748, 226 P.2d 192 (1951). See also Cannavina v. Poston, 13 Wn.2d
182, 124 P.2d 787 (1942) ; Walker v. Sieg, 23 Wn.2d 552, 161 P.2d 542 (1945).
199 13 Wn.2d 182, 124 P.2d 787 (1942).
200 A proposal to compromise a disputed claim should fail as an acknowledgment
both because it is in fact an offer, a conditional undertaking, and the condition has not
been met, and also because it has no probative value when offered to prove that exist-

ence of the obligation was acknowledged. See 1 CoaI N, CoNMAcTs § 216 p. 717 n. 55
(1950).
201.9 Wn.2d 214, 114 P.2d 526 (1941).
20215 Wn.2d 239,
203 See 1 CoaiN,

130 P.2d 333 (1942).
CoNTRACTs § 218 (1950).

204 18 Wn.2d 434, 139 P.2d 616 (1943). One judge dissented, saying in part: "Obviously, if the contract is given force, the judgment and claim or demand upon which it
is based is extended for a total period of tvelve years."
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forbidding any "suit, action or other proceeding" by which the duration
of a judgment shall be extended beyond six years from the date of
its entry, it seemed quite possible that the court would analyze this
type of transaction as an attempt to accomplish a violation of the
statute by indirection.
It has been generally assumed that the duty of a tort-feasor to compensate his victim could not be tolled, save where the tort could be
waived and assumpsit maintained."' In two pre-1937 cases the Washington court indicated its adherence to this limitation.2 0 Opitz v.
Hayden. 7 reached a contrary result, enforcing a promise to pay for a
tortious injury, despite prior expiration of the time within which an
action could have been brought. The earlier decisions were not mentioned, and the opinion does not contain the extended discussion expectable in a holding which departs from a long-settled principle. Evaluation of the case and of its meaning for the future is accordingly difficult. 0 8 It does not appear to have been cited in any other opinion.
Maybe the existence of this decision will encourage a thorough reexamination of tolling in relation to this type of obligation. Upon such a
reexamination, the traditional exclusion of tort obligations from the
tolling process may be found to have been more fortuitous than logical.
Moral consideration. The court has gone further than most in enforcing promises supported by antecedent benefits which, when conferred, created no legal duty in the recipient. 08 There has been, however, no significant development in this area since 1937.210
2-5 1 WLISTON, CONTRACTS § 186 (rev. ed. 1936); 1 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 221
(1950).
20 0
Luketa v. American Packing Co., 139 Wash. 625, 247 Pac. 964 (1926) ; Belcher
v. Tacoma Eastern R. Co., 99 Wash. 34, 168 Pac. 782 (1917) (dictum).
207 17 Wn2d 347, 135 P.2d 819 (1943).
Three judges dissented. The injury was
seduction; after discussing the general tolling principles, the majority said: "... under
the rules above stated, the claim which respondent originally had for her seduction by
decedent furnished a valid consideration for what may have merely an executory
promise of compensation...."
208 The promise to compensate for the seduction, which had occurred 14 years previously, was made under threat of suit and was part of an agreement by which the
victim surrendered her claim for damages. The court discussed the surrender of her
claim as consideration, and concluded she had at least a doubtful claim, surrender of
which was consideration. If a valid settlement contract was formed there was no
occasion to draw in tolling as an issue; under this approach, the problem posed by the
statute of limitations was simply whether the intervention of the statutory bar precludes surrender of the claim from being consideration. It can accordingly be argued
that the court's holding and language about tolling was un-necessary. To what extent
this bears on the authority of that language and holding is not clear.
209 See Palmer, Moral Obligation as consideration for a promise in Washington, 10

L. REv. 181 (1935).
210 Richey v. Bolton, 18 Wn.2d 522, 140 P.2d 253 (1943)

NVAsH.

(followed an earlier case
in holding that prior services in finding a buyer for land, under an oral and hence unenforceable arrangement, supported a later promise to pay a commission); Opitz v.
Hayden, 17 Wn2d 347, 135 P.2d 819 (1943) (which involved a tort obligation and a
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Promissory estoppel. By 1937, the Washington cases in which a
promise was sought to be enforced because of an unbargained-for and
detrimental change of position by the promisee in reliance on receiving
the promised performance, were in a state of confusion.211 This was
no local phenomenon. Although the promisee's reliance was long ago
deemed by English judges to be a sufficient reason for enforcing a
promise, the cross-currents set in motion by the development of consideration and its connotations of exchange and bargain inhibited orderly
development in the reliance area. 1
In the analysis and decision of the later cases, section 90 of the
ContractsRestatement has been an increasingly helpful factor. It provides a formula by which reliance problems can be handled with some
assurance, however divergent the attendant facts may be.21 That the
formula is in general acceptable to the Washington court now seems
fairly evident.21 Section 90 will probably provide the arguments and
ratio decidendi in future Washington litigation concerned with promissory estoppel. Some clues to the operation of the propositions which
make up section 90 are present in the decisions of the past twenty years.
promise to pay made after the statute of limitations had run; the opinion contains a
good summary of the facts which will create a "moral obligation.") See also Annotation, Moral Obligation as considerationfor executory promise, 17 A.L.R. 1299, supp.
79 A.L.R. 1346; Moral Obligation as considcration for contract-modern trend, 8
A.L.R.2d 787.
211 Reliance was said to be a sufficient reason for enforcement, in Hidden v. German
Say. and Loan Soc., 48 Wash. 384, 93 Pac. 668 (1908) ; Coleman v. Larson, 49 Wash.
321, 95 Pac. 262 (1908) ; Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Olds Co., 84 Wash. 630, 147
Pac. 406 (1915) ; DePauw University v. Ankeny, 97 Wash. 451, 166 Pac. 1148 (1917) ;
Raymond v. Hattrick, 104 Wash. 619, 177 Pac. 640 (1919) ; Ellison v. Keith, 117 Wash.
648, 202 Pac. 241 (1921). Contrary results were reached in Mitchell v. Pirie, 38 Wash.
691, 80 Pac. 774 (1905) and Hudson v. Ellsworth, 56 Wash. 243, 105 Pac. 463 (1909);
see also Jenkins v. Jenkins University, 17 Wash. 160, 49 Pac. 247, 50 Pac. 785 (1897).
212 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 138, 139 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONRACTS §§
195, 196 (1950). The reliance cases are discussed in Boyer, Promissory estoppel; requirementsand limitations of the doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1950) ; Boyer, Promissory estoppel; principle from precedents, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 639, 873 (1952) ; Shattuck, Gratuitouspromises-a new writ?, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 908 (1937).
213 This section reads: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." It will be noted that in its several
elements-reasonable anticipation by the promisor, a substantial change of position
actually induced, and the avoidance of injustice-the court is provided with a high
degree of control and flexibility in reaching its decision. The greatest contribution of
the section its its provision of a reasonable and sensible approach to reliance litigation,
disassociated from the pidgeon-holing of problems in terms of promises to give land,
promises to act as bailee and agent, and so forth, which had theretofore characterized
the2 cases.
See 1 COanINr, CONTRACTS § 200 (1950).
4
1 In Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., n. 215 below, the
court quoted § 90 and said
of it: "We recognized and discussed this rule in Luther v. National Bank of Commerce
(1940) 2 Wn. (2d) 470, 98 P. (2d) 667; Hazlett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
(1942), 14 Wn. (2) 124, 127 P. (2d) 273; State v. Northwest Mangesite Co. (1947),
28 Wn. (2d) 1, 182 P. (2d) 643) ; Hill v. Corbett (1949), 33 Wn. (2d) 219, 204 P.
(2d) 845." See however n. 218, 219 below.
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Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.215 put in issue an undertaking by an
employer to pay a bonus, with a reservation of the power to withhold,
decrease, or discontinue the bonus. The court said of promissory
estoppel: "But before this rule can be applied, there must be a real
promise to be enforced. Action in reliance upon a supposed promise
creates no obligation on an individual or corporation whose only promise
is wholly illusory." 16 Enforcement of the alleged promise to pay a
bonus was accordingly refused.
In Hill v. Corbett' 7 enforcement of a gratuitous option was refused,
the court saying of the promisee's conduct in reliance that he had not
proved the promisor should reasonably have expected such conduct.
Forbearance as a manifestation of reliance was in issue in Hazlett v.
First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n." ' The defendant's promise was to
procure insurance; the plaintiff's reliance was in not obtaining insurance
himself. Of section 90 and the passage: "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance . . . ," the
court said: "Surely, forbearance was not intended to include the mere
passive failure of the promisee to procure elsewhere, or by other means,
the service or the thing promised." That the draftsmen of section 90
had any such distinction in mind seems most unlikely. The creation
of categories of non-action, only some of which are sufficient reliance,
is a process hard indeed to justify on any logical basis. This is a hold219
ing which may be vulnerable to attack in future litigation.
Whether reliance as a reason for enforcement should be limited to
gratuitous promises, those in which the promisor expected no exchange,
is a troublesome and unsettled detail. If any promise can be sustained
by reliance, bargaining transactions which are not contracts because
215 47 Wn.2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955) noted 31 WASH. L. REv. 109 (1956). In
support
216 of the court's result, is 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 201 (1950).
See also Gray v. Lipscomb, 48 Wn.2d 624, 296 P.2d 308 (1956).
21733 Wn.2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949)
(a lessee, anticipating expiry of his lease,
bought other property; then, having acquired a gratuitous option to buy the leased
property, he leased his own property for a term extending past the terminal date of
the lease under which he was a tenant).
21 14 Wn.2d 124, 127 P.2d 273 (1942).
210 Promises to procure insurance differ from most gratuitous undertakings, in that
the promisee's loss on non-performance (assuming the property is destroyed) greatly
exceeds the worth of the promised performance, viewed as a service. Whether this fact
should be stressed rather than the promisee's loss through reliance is arguable. See
1 CORmN, CoNTRACTs § 208 (1950). If it is stressed, the consequence might better be
adjustment of the amount of damages instead of denial of any cause of action. Our
court was evidently influenced by Hudson v. Ellsworth, n. 211 above, which also involved a gratuitous promise to take out insurance, not enforced. No progress can be
made if all the earlier cases are followed, without review of the circumstances which
put those cases in opposition to each other. Hudson v. Ellsworth was not, when
decided, easily reconciled with the Hidden and Larson cases (n. 211 above) which
preceded it.
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a consideration principle was not satisfied may nevertheless result in
legal obligation. To the extent that they do, the consideration principle has ceased to accomplish whatever objective courts sought in
creating it. Two later cases illustrate the problem. Luther v. National
Bank of Commerce"0 involved a promise to devise and bequeath property to the promisee, made as an offer requesting the offeree to sell her
hospital and care for the promisor during his lifetime. The hospital
was sold, promisor and promisee were married, and the requested care
rendered.
The services rendered after marriage offended the
antecedent-duty rule, being the subject of a wife's legal duty to her
husband. As an alternative ground for enforcement of the promise,
the court said:
We think that another rule applicable to the facts of this case is that
found in Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 110, Sec. 90 .... It

seems to us that it would be a gross injustice to deny respondent the
benefit of her bargain, which she performed to the letter, merely
because by operation of law the services which she rendered
subse221
quent to marriage are held to be without consideration.
Douglas County Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Newby222 involved a
debtor's promise to pay a hospital bill at the rate of twenty dollars per
month (apparently without interest) and the creditor's promise (assumed by all concerned to exist) to forbear collection of the gross
account. The creditor sued, in violation of its promise, and lost. Said
the court: "We hold that respondent, under the facts in this case, is
estopped to deny that there was a valid consideration for the written
contract. By that contract, appellants were induced to voluntarily pay
to the hospital a substantial portion of a debt which they were wholly
unable to pay in a lump sum when it was incurred. Without any inconvenience or expense of collection, the hospital received approxi22 3
mately one third of the indebtedness.M
Just what is left of the principle which disables an obligor from providing consideration for a promise by his obligee, in the doing or promising of something he was already under a legal duty to do? Will re2202 Wn.2d 470, 98 P.2d 667 (1940), noted 16
221 The court no doubt meant to say, in the

WAsH. L. REv. 49 (1941).

phrase "without consideration," "incapable of being consideration."
22245 Wn.2d 784, 278 P.2d 330 (1954), noted 30 WAsHr. L. REv. 104 (1955).
223 The court did not mention § 90 of the Contracts Restatement. It cited several
earlier cases holding that a creditor who had actually received a part payment and
promised to accept it as payment in full could not collect the difference (which are certainly not in point), and Vigelius v. Vigelius, 169 Wash. 190, 13 P.2d 425 (1932),
which does support the holding. See also Hidden v. German Say. and Loan Socy, 48
Wash. 384, 93 Pac. 668 (1908). Cf. CoanIN, CONTRACTS § 200 p. 658 (1950).
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liance salvage exchange transactions which run afoul of other consideration principles? In finding a sufficient reliance in acts which were insufficient consideration, the Luther and Douglas County Memorial Hospital Ass'n cases suggest answers to these questions which should distress anyone who feels that the consideration principles represent desirable ethical controls over the creation of contract obligations.
At another point the boundary between bargain and reliance is
is demonstrably tenuous. The thing done by a promisee in reliance on
the promise is often a thing which would have been consideration had
the promisor requested it. Implying the request or assuming it to have
been made are judicial technics by which a gift promise becomes a
bargain and the promisor is held without mention of promissory estoppel. Franklin v. Fischer2 4 would appear to be an illustration. Greater
familiarity with the potential in reliance as a ground for enforcing
promises should reduce the incidence of such decisions.
FOR ATION OF FoimrZAL CONTRACTS-CoNTRACTS UNDER SEAL

The period under review produced but one decision pertinent to this
section. Its import is indicated in the following passage from the
opinion:
WVe think the instrument here in issue is not a sealed instrument.
The signatures of the parties were not accompanied by a scroll, seal,
the printed or written word "SEAL" or "L.S." or any other symbol
which manifested an intention to make the instrument a specialty ....
As to the recital "signed and sealed" in the certificate of acknowledgment, if the instrument had borne a seal it may be conceded that such
a recital would have been corroborative, but the recital standing alone
225
would not change an unsealed instrument into a sealed one.

CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS NOT PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT

Where a performance promised by a contracting party runs to a third
person, not to the promisee, can the third-person-beneficiary sue the
promisor on his default? 226 Such a suit is arguably by a stranger to the
contract and conceptually impossible. Although it has troubled some
224 34 Wn.2d 342, 208 P.2d 902 (1949).
225 Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949).

226 In some transactions and in some opinions it is not clear whether the third person
is a promisee or is only to receive performance; it is quite possible for A to make a
promise to C at the request of and for a consideration provide dby B. See for an example of an opinion difficult to analyze, Richey v. Bolton, 18 Wn.2d 522, 140 P.2d 253
(1943). Recovery by a third person who would have been benefited by performance of
a promise which by its terms called for performance to the promisee only seems unlikely. Loan agreements under which the borrower is to receive a loan to finance
construction create no enforceable rights in the borrower's workmen or suppliers.

Lloyd Co. v. Wyman, 16 Wn.2d 621, 134 P.2d 459 (1943)

(principle recognized
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courts,227

the argument is unsound. It assumes a negative answer to
the real issue, "can a contract create a right-duty relationship between
beneficiary and promisor"? In determining this issue, courts either
create a new principle by which the benficiary becomes a party to the
contract, or refuse to; there is nothing more fundamental to which
resort can be had for an answer. Washington has chosen to create the
new principle,"2 as have most American courts. 29 There is no theoretic
barrier to recovery by a beneficary in Washington; the only problem is
to ascertain what standards the third person must meet in order to recover.
Washington cases involving promises to pay the promisee's debt to
a third person were numerous in the period before 1937. They appear
to require of the beneficiary proof only of the debt and of the contractpromise to pay it, and have been followed in the more recent decisions."
Cases of the past twenty years have for the most part concerned third
persons who would have received a performance under the contract as
a gratuity, and provide some information about the criteria such peralthough not in issue); 4 ConaiN, CONTRACTS § 779D (1932),; see also Priestly v.

Peterson, 19 Wn.2d 820, 145 P.2d 253 (1944). The contractor's bond cases are also
informative; interpretation of the surety's promise, to determine whether it undertook
to pay only the owner, or to pay laborers and materialmen, is a common technique. CORBIN op cit. § 800. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 133 comment d provides: "A contract for
the benefit of a third person usually provides that performance shall be rendered
directly to the beneficiary, but this is not necessarily the case. A promise to discharge
an indebtedness of one whom the contract is made to benefit, will provide for payment
to the creditor of the beneficiary, not to the beneficiary himself who owes the money."
Transactions of this type must be uncommon.
227 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 347 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).
228 See the cases cited, Washington Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts p.
64 et seq.
229 "The pressing necessity of the situation and the inherent reasonableness of this
solution (relief for the beneficiary) has led the great majority of the American courts
frankly to recognize, as does the Restatement of Contracts, that through this travail
the common law has given birth to a distinct, new principle of law which takes its own
place in the family of legal principles, and gives not only to a donee beneficiary, but
also to a creditor beneficiary, the right to enforce directly the promise from which he
derives his interest." 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 357 at p. 1049 (rev. ed. 1936).
230 The early cases are cited in Washington Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts p. 64 et seq. See also the discussion in Priestly v. Peterson, 19 Wn.2d 820, 145
P.2d 253 (1944) ; Cascade Timber Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 28 Wn.2d 684, 184
P.2d 90 (1947). See also McCarty v. King County Med. etc. Corp., 26 Wn.2d 660,
175 P.2d 653 (1946) which may involve a creditor-beneficiary transaction. Union contracts with employers occupy an anomolous middle position; if the union owes its
members a duty to procure promises from employers about pay rates and working conditions an argument of sorts for creditor-beneficiary classification of employees can
be made. In Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 4 Wn.2d 449, 103 P.2d 1095
(1940) the court apparently accepted the employee's contention that he was a contract
beneficiary but failed to disclose the details of its reasoning. Cases elsewhere are
divided in their analyses, many finding the union contract to be operative as a part of
each individual hiring arrangement. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 379A (rev. ed.
1936). The opinion in Clark v. Claremont Apt. Hotels Co., 19 Wn.2d 115, 141 P.2d 403
(1943) contains some language suggesting adherence by the court to this view of the
union contract.
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sons must satisfy. "Intent" seems to be the touchstone; whose intent
and intent about what are the vital details. 3' The court has not been
willing to regard as conclusive proof of the requisite intent the fact
that the promisee bargained for and received a promise, the performance of which was to go to another. Whether this fact is even prima
facie proof is not clearly determinable from the opinions. Arguably
it should be. Here, as in interpretation controversies, evidence of the
context in which the contract was made is admissible as an aid to ascertaining intent. 3
Whose intent should control? Since the promisee bought the promise
and specified performance to the third person, it is his purpose which
must govern. The latest Washington cases accord with this analysis, 3'
234
as does also the Restatement of Contracts.
What intent by the promisee must be proved? This is the point of
greatest difficulty, made so by its inherent complexity and by the divergent language the court has used in discussing it. Two quite diferent types of transaction are encountered. There are on the one
hand transactions in which the promisee's purpose to make a gift to
the beneficiary is demonstrable, as in non-business life insurance contracts. For them, proof of the gift purpose will no doubt suffice. 35
Musterng the proof is not apt to be difficult. Where the beneficiary is
the natural object of the promisee's bounty and the promisee has, as to
the performance in question, no apparent objective save benefit to the
beneficiary, the inference of gift purpose is probably strong enough to
establish the beneficiary's cause of action. There are on the other
231 This is true also in American jurisdictions generally. See 2 WILLisToN, Cox357 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CoRBiN, CONTRACTs §§ 776, 777 (1950).
Ridder v. Blethen, 24 Wn2d 552, 166 P.2d 834 (1946). The promisee was also
permitted to testify directly about his purpose and a good deal of evidence bearing
directly on the promisor's purpose (he having died prior to the action) was also
admitted. It is not clear from the opinion whether evidence of this type was deemed
proper because of waiver or whether it would be deemed proper without regard to any
waiver.
2
33 Cascade Timber Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 28 Wn.2d 684, 184 P.2d 90 (1947);
Vikingstad v. Baggott, 46 Wn.2d 494, 282 P.2d 824 (1955). See also Jeffery v. Hanson,
39 Wn.2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952) (which appears to involve a donee transaction
although the case refers to creditor beneficiary precedents). In some other opinions
the court referred to "intent of the parties"; Grand Lodge etc. v. United States
F. & G. Co., 2 Wn.2d, 561, 98 P.2d 971 (1940); Ridder v. Blethen, 24 Wn.2d 552,
166 P.2d 834 (1946). Despite this language it seems clear enough that the court considered only the promisee's purpose in the Grand Lodge case. In the Ridder case,
however, the court did examine the purpose of both parties and placed more emphasis
on the promisor's than on the promisee's. Doing so may have been justified because of
the unusual circumstances of the transaction. In the usual transaction, exploration of
the intent of both promisor and promisee is unnecessary and confusing. It is to be
hoped that in future opinions the phrase "intent of the parties" will not reappear.
2'34 § 133(1) (a).
235 The court so said in Ridder v. Blethen, 24 Wn2d 552, 166 P.2d 834 (1946). See
also Toulouse v. New York Life Ins. Co., 40 Wn2d 538, 245 P.2d 205 (1952).
2cRAcTs
32 §§ 356A,
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hand transactions in which the promisee's motivation is economic
benefit for himself. The existence of this motive, plus the absence of
a relationship between them which makes natural a gift from promisee
to beneficiary, can easily lead to a fautly conclusion about the promisee's
intent. A good illustration of the problem is found in Cascade Timber
Co. v. NorthernPac. Ry., 236 which involved a real estate contract with
a provision obligating the buyer to offer all timber cut from the property to Northwest Door Company. The buyer's argument against
beneficiary status for the door company was absence of intent by the
seller, the railroad, to make a gift and a purpose by it to gain as much
freight revenue as possible; the railroad would carry whatever logs the
door company acquired. There is a serious flaw in such an argument.
Accomplishment of the promisee's objective would be advanced if the
beneficiary acquired a right against the promisor. This fact is the
really important element. From it, intent by the promisee to create the
requisite right in the benficiary is the only proper inference. This the
court recognized in the Cascade Timber Co. decision. Vikingstad v.
Baggott237 is a similar holding. It approved and followed the Restatement of Contracts... in acknowledging the effectiveness of intent
by the promisee either to make a gift to the beneficiary or to create a
right in the beneficiary.
In the Cascade Timber Co. and Vikingstad cases, the court has developed a formula which should help materially in the analysis and
decision of future donee beneficiary controversies. There are in some
other cases less concrete expressions by the court about intent; 3 these
may well be found not to merit repetition in future opinions.
23628 Wn.2d 684, 184 P.2d 90 (1947).
237 46 Wn.2d 494, 282 P,2d 824 (1955) See also Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wn.2d 855,
239 P.2d 346 (1952), (which appears to involve a donee transaction).
238 Section 133 (1) (a).
239
For example, the statement, "To constitute one a donee beneficiary, it must
appear that the contract was designed for his benefit, or that it was the intent and purpose of the parties to bestow a benefit or gift upon him," which appears in Ridder v.
Blethen, 24 Wn.2d 552, 166 P.2d 834 (1946) ; or that which appears in Grand Lodge
etc. v. United States F. & G. Co., 2 Wn.2d 561, 98 P.2d 971 (1940) : "Ordinarily it is
sufficient if the contract was evidently made for the benefit of the third person. Where
the contract between the first part yand the second party was entered into for the
benefit of others, and where it appears that such benefit must be the direct result of
performance and so within the contemplation of the parties, the third persons may
enforce the contract

. . .'"

The variant language the court has used certainly confuses

the problem. If the "intent to confer a right" test stated in the Vikingstad case, n. 237
above, is adhered to and other phrasings such as used in the Ridder and Grand Lodge
cases are abandoned, there is hope that in time a body of precedent will build up from
which some assurance about the outcome of future litigation can be derived. It will be
noted that debt assumption transactions, analyzed in terms of the promisee's purpose,
closely resemble these donee beneficiary cases. The Cascade Timber Company and
Vikingstad decisions create doubt about the durability of the court's early private-work
construction bond holdings. These stressed the desire of the owner to protect himself,
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It can be said with some assurance that a donee beneficiary is not
obliged to prove delivery of something to him, either as an element of
24
his proof of the promisee's intent or as an independent requirement.
Formation of a contract between promisor and promisee and the
existence of whatever "intent" the court demands suffice to create
in the beneficiary a legal right to receive the promisor's performance
and a correlative legal duty in the promisor. This is so even though
the promsee's death is an express condition to the promisor's duty to
perform and the demands of the statute of wills have not been met.' 4 On
the other hand, the beneficiary is not obliged to accept the new legal
relationship; if he disclaims it, it will no longer exist.24 2 Any bene-

ficiary's right is of course limited by the terms of the contract and by
any express or constructive conditions qualifying the promisor's duty.243
The interest of a donee beneficiary is not, however, vulnerable to a subsequent unconsented-to rescission or modification by promisor and
promisee.-1"

(This article will be continued in subsequent issues.)

to the point of denying beneficiary status to the contractor's workmen and suppliers.
See e.g. Rust v. United F. & G. Co., 87 Wash. 93, 151 Pac. 248 (1915) ; other bond
cases are cited in Washington Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts p. 67, 68.
Application of the reasoning of the Vikingstad case to a construction bond would make
it difficult to reach the result of the Rust case. In other states the decisions on such
bonds are divided in result; there are many in which workmen and suppliers have
rights against the surety, either as donees or as a special variety of creditor beneficiary. 4 CoPiN, CONTRACTS § 799 (1950). That specific identification of the beneficiary when the contract was made is not a requisite seems clear enough. Chandler v.
Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wn.2d 591, 137 P.2d 97 (1943) is illustrative
although the point wras not put in issue. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACT § 139 (1932);
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 378 (rev. ed. 1936).
19 Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939) noted 14 WASH. L. Ray.
312 (1939) threatened to introduce into donee beneficiary transactions the delivery concept which appertains to chattel-gifts. The case involved a government bond naming
a third person as the recipient of the proceeds on the promisee's death. The court regarded the bond proceeds as tangible property and as the subject matter of the gift
which faild for lack of delivery. This analysis seems obviously faulty. The effect of
the case on government bonds was destroyed by legislation; RCW 11.04.240; see also
RCW 11.04.230. Extension of the Decker case reasoning to a life insurance transaction
was refused in Toulouse v. New York Life Ins. Co. 40 Wn.2d 538, 245 P.2d 205 (1952),
in langauge which make its application in any other situation also unlikely.
241 Toulouse v. New York Life Ins. Co., 40 Wn2d 538, 245 P.2d 205 (1952).
2 2
' RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 137 (1932) ; Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal
Co., 4 Wn.2d 449, 103 P.2d 1095 (1940).
243 Terry v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 196 Wash. 206, 82 P.2d 532 (1938);
McCarty v. King Co. Med. etc. Corp., 26 Wn.2d 660, 175 P.2d 653 (1946) ; Towey v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 27 Wn.2d 829, 180 P.2d 815 (1947). See also WI.LISTON,
CONTRACTS § 394 (rev. ed. 1936). ConnIN, CONTRACTS §§ 817 et seq. (1950).
44 Grand Lodge v. United States F. & G. Co., 2 Wn.2d 561, 98 P.2d 971 (1940).
Cf. Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 4 Wn.2d 449, 103 P.2d 1095 (1940)
(union contract; dictum worded "After a contract for the benefit of a third person has
been accepted or acted on by such third person beneficiary, the contract cannot be
rescinded by the parties without his consent"; "accepted or acted on" is not usually
appended in modern cases as a qualification of a donee's interest, although it does have
considerable currency in creditor beneficiary cases; see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§
142, 143 (1932) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 396 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CORIN,
CONTRACTS §§ 813 et seq. (1950).

